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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

Questar Pipeline Company,
Petitioner,
Case No. 900592

v.
Utah State Tax Commission,
Respondent.

OPENING BRIEF OF PETITIONER
QUESTAR PIPELINE COMPANY
Petitioner Questar Pipeline Company respectfully submits its initial brief in
support of its petition for review of a decision of the Utah State Tax Commission,
issued December 30, 1990.
INTRODUCTORY MATTERS
Statement of Jurisdiction.
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. §§ 63-46b-16 (1989) and 78-2-2(3)(e)(ii) (Supp. 1990).
Statement of Issue and Standard of Review.
The issue for review is whether the Utah Tax Commission has properly
determined Questar's 1988 property-tax valuation in light of the stipulated facts,

the testimony of the witnesses at the hearing held by the Tax Commission, applicable agency precedent, the Utah Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA), and
interpretative case law.
The standard for review of Tax Commission decisions is the UAPA, which
provides, in part:
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on the basis
of the agency's record, it determines that a person seeking judicial
review has been substantially prejudiced by any of the following:
(g) The agency action is based upon a determination of
fact, made or implied by the agency, that is not supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole record before the
court;
(h) The agency action is:
(i) An abuse of the discretion delegated to the
agency by statute; . . . (iii) contrary to the agency's prior practice,
unless the agency justifies the inconsistency by giving facts and
reasons that demonstrate a fair and rational basis for the inconsistencies; or (iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious.1
Determinative Statutes, Ordinances and Rules.
With respect to the issues that are in dispute, this case appears to be one of
first impression for this Court.

Thus, the determinative law that applies is the

UAPA, quoted in the prior section.

x

Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-46b-16(4)(g) and (h) (1989).
-2-

Statement of the Case.
Nature of the Case. Questar is an interstate natural gas pipeline company,
virtually all of whose facilities and operations, including its rates and charges, are
subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC).
The Company operates integrated transportation, storage and related facilities in
Wyoming, Colorado and several counties in Utah. It is accordingly subject to the
provisions of Part 2 of Chapter 2 of Title 59 of the Utah Code, requiring the
central assessment of its properties by the Tax Commission for the purposes of
determining Questar's property taxes.2
This case has arisen out of a dispute over the proper assessment of the fair
market value of Questar's system for the tax year 1988. Although some elements
of the final determination of Questar's tax assessment were stipulated, Questar
believes the final appraised value of its property was unlawfully determined.
Course of the Proceedings.

In April 1988, the Commission, through its

Property Tax Division,3 issued a preliminary assessment of $300,000,000 as the
fair market value of Questar for the tax year 1988. Subsequently, the Division
materially modified various elements in the underlying calculations and then issued
its official assessment on April 29, 1988—still at $300,000,000. Questar paid its
assessed property taxes under protest and sought a redetermination of its assess2

Utah Code Ann. §§ 59-2-201 through -217 (1987 & Supp. 1990).

3

See note 9, infra.
~3-

ment on May 31, 1988. (R. 398-401.)
Prior to the hearing and after the parties had engaged in discovery, the
Property Tax Division (the Division) and Questar narrowed the issues by stipulating to the validity of certain formal calculations.

(R. 380-81.)

The proceeding

was thus reduced to a dispute concerning the appropriate "correlation" or weighting of three separate estimation methods to obtain a proper determination of the
fair market value of Questar (as appropriately adjusted for statutory deductions
such as intangible property and inventory).
An evidentiary hearing was held on March 26, 1990, at which Questar and
the Division presented expert witnesses to discuss the appropriate way in which to
utilize the stipulated facts.

The hearing was held before two of the four Tax

Commissioners and a hearing officer designated by the Commission. Oral argument was conducted before this panel on April 4, 1990, and the issue was submitted without written briefs. Questar's position was that the most reliable estimate
of its fair market value, in light of the stipulated facts and calculations, was between $221 and $236 million. The Property Tax Division's position was, notwithstanding that the stipulated facts and calculations were different from those at the
outset of the proceedings, the fair market value of Questar was still $300 million.
Disposition. The Tax Commission issued its final decision on December 3,
1990 (the December decision), finding that "the correlated value is $296,000,000."

Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-46b-16 (1989) and 78-2-2(3)(e)(ii)
-4-

(Supp. 1990), Questar sought this Court's review of that order.
Statement of Facts.
Questar is an interstate pipeline whose operations extend into Colorado,
Wyoming and several counties in Utah. Virtually all aspects of its operations are
subject to the rate regulation of the FERC (R. 29, 54, 202), and its rates are set
by the FERC on the basis of a reasonable return on its depreciated, original-cost
"rate base." The rate base is the investment on which the owners of the company
may earn a rate of return that is competitive with returns on similar investments.
(R. 89-91.) The investment base is determined, with some adjustments, to be the
original cost of the properties, less the accumulated depreciation.4

It is, with

minor differences, equivalent to the "cost method" for estimating a company's
value. (R. 31.)
On the lien date of January 1, 1988, Questar was a second-tier subsidiary
of Questar Corporation, a Utah corporation whose common stock is publicly
traded.

(R. 27.)

By nearly all measures, Questar constitutes a minority of the

size of its parent corporation, Questar Corporation:

Questar's plant and equip-

ment are approximately 29 % of that of the consolidated parent, its gross revenues
4

[R]ate base . . . starts out with a net plant of a company such as
Questar Pipeline, net plant being the gross plant minus accumulated
depreciation. There are adjustments made to net plant to come up
with rate base. Those adjustments include such items a prepayments,
working capital, and a deduction for deferred federal income taxes.

(R. 30, testimony of Morris J. Jackson. See also R. 43 and R. 247 [Ex, 2].)
-5-

are 33% of the parent, and its payroll is 20% of the total corporate payroll. (Id.)
Operations conducted through Questar Corporation's other subsidiaries include
local natural gas distribution (Mountain Fuel Supply Company), oil-and-gas development and production (Wexpro Company), oil-and-gas exploration and development (Celsius Energy Company and Universal Resources Corporation), brick
manufacturing and retailing (Interstate Brick Company), and telecommunications
and computer services (Questar Service Company). (R. 28 and Exhibit 12.)5
On or about April 7, 1988, the Property Tax Division submitted its preliminary assessment to Questar. This assessment indicated a systemwide appraisal of
$300 million.6

(R. 31, R. 245 [Ex. 1].)

Accompanying this assessment were

calculations for the cost method ($219 million), the income method ($300 million), and the stock-and-debt method ($362 million).7 There was no indication of
what weight was attributed to each value in arriving at a single appraisal.
After discussions between Questar and the Property Tax Division, several
5

Exhibit 12 was Questar's 1987 Annual Report to Shareholders. (R. 233.) It
was not included in the record originally transmitted to the Court, but will be
submitted by stipulation shortly after this brief is filed.
6

Because the parties stipulated to the methodology for determining the Utah
portion of the pipeline's FMV, the discussion throughout this brief will refer only
to the total value of Questar's multi-state system.
7

The cost method, described above, is based primarily on the depreciated,
original-cost rate base used by the FERC for rate-making; the income method is
intended to evaluate the company on the basis of its net income; the stock-anddebt (or "market") method considers value based on outstanding common stock
value and the company's total debt commitment.
-6-

adjustments to the calculations for the three methods were made, yielding $210
million for the cost method (down $9 million), $303 million for income (up $3
million), and $340 million for stock-and-debt (down $22 million). Notwithstanding the changes in the individual estimates, the "official" assessment issued on
April 29, 1988, was unchanged at $300 million.8 (Id.)
Later, the Property Tax Division responded to a Questar interrogatory
seeking the workpapers and backup schedules for its official evaluation and indicated it had made an overall assessment of $292 million, derived from $220
million for the cost method, $310 million for income, $312 million for stock-anddebt ($220/310/312 = $292 million.)

(R. 31-32, R. 245 [Ex. 1], R. 318

[Ex. 9].)
The final values—$210/303/312 millions, respectively—were stipulated to
by the parties prior to the commencement of the hearings. Without agreeing to
any particular calculation method or the importance, viability, reliability or fundamental applicability of the methods, the parties agreed that they would not contest
the underlying calculations of the three methods. (R. 380-81.)

Because this case centers around the appropriate weighting of the three values
obtained from the cost, income and stock-and-debt methods, this brief will refer to
them in that order at various times. Thus, the preliminary assessment of April 7,
1988, is characterized by the notation 219/300/362 = $300 million and the
official assessment issued on April 29, 1988, is represented by 210/303/340 =
$300 million.

-7-

Summary of the Argument.
The Commission's determination of the fair market value of Questar for
1988 is unlawful for several reasons:
(a) The Commission provides little or no indication of its derivation of the
final assessment, a result that does not meet the standards of Utah Administrative
Procedures Act as interpreted by First National Bank of Boston v. County Board
of Equalization, 799 P.2d 1163 (Utah 1990).

There is no roadmap or rational

explanation by the Commission to indicate how it weighted the three stipulated
estimates to arrive at a final assessment.
(b) In its apparent rejection of the cost /rate-base method for measuring the
fair market value of Questar, the agency's action is contrary to any reasonable
interpretation of the evidence and is therefore unlawful as not being supported by
substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole record.
(c) In refusing to apply its prior practice with respect to the stock-and-debt
method, as articulated in Northwest Pipeline Corporation v. Property Tax Division, Case Nos. 85-0074 and 86-0255 (Utah Tax Comm'n, Dec. 21, 1987), the
Commission's action is discriminatory and unlawful under Utah Code Ann.
§ 63-46b-16(4)(h)(iii) (1989).
(d) In declaring the income method the "most reliable," the Commission
totally ignored the unrefuted demonstration that this method, as applied in this
case, is equivalent to the stock-and-debt method.
-8-

(e) To the extent that the Tax Commission's Property Tax Division9 conducted a "moving target" exercise in which the taxpayer never knew the position
or the rationale behind the position concerning the 1988 assessment, the Commission has acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner, contrary to the UAPA.
DETAILED ARGUMENT
Introduction
The objective in this case was to determine the "fair market value" (FMV)
of the subject property, as that term is defined in Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-102(2)
(1987) on January 1, 1988:10
"Fair market value" means the amount at which property would
change hands between a willing buyer and a willing seller, neither
being under any compulsion to buy or sell and both having reasonable knowledge of the relevant facts.
As a practical matter, there are no willing buyers and sellers that would directly

9

The Utah Code does not identify the "Property Tax Division" as a legal
entity separate from the Tax Commission. The Division is merely an operating
group within the Tax Commission, and there is no legal distinction between the
two. Accordingly, actions taken by the Division are those of the Commission and
subject to the same standards of scrutiny on review. For example, proceedings
that style the Property Tax Division as a party to the determination (see R. 392)
do not involve an adjudication of the position of the Property Tax Division by an
independent tribunal. Indeed, there appears to be no distinction between the two,
as the record submitted by the Tax Commission contains settlement documents
that were exchanged between Questar and the Property Tax Division (R. 395-96)
and presumably not to be made available to the Commission itself.
10

Subsequent amendment by the Legislature changed the designation of § 59-2102(6) and added the qualification "and includes the adjustment for intangibles
under section 59-2-304
-9-

satisfy the definition of § 59-2-102(2). Because there are few or no comparable
sales of properties that would provide a direct reading of the FMV of large, multistate, rate-regulated entities such as Questar, as well as utilities, railroads, electric
transmission companies and other multi-county businesses, it is necessary to use
surrogate measures to determine the FMV.
In the case before the Court, the parties stipulated that the FMV of
Questar's multi-state system would be some combination (or "correlation") of the
stipulated values for three commonly used surrogate measures of value: the cost
method, the income method, and the stock-and-debt (or market) method.11

The

parties agreed not to argue about the actual computations used to obtain these
three measures (although they didn't necessarily agree with one another), but
agreed to disagree on the relative strength, weakness, reliability, and applicability
of the methods.

Thus, the disagreement was focused on the proper weighting to

be assigned to each of the three methods in arriving at a single estimate of the
FMV of Questar. In this context, the issue before the Court concerns the weight-

n

The process of synthesizing a single value from the three separate measures
available is often referred to as "correlation." This term is not the same as the
statistical concept of correlation, which was one of the elements of the testimony
of Professor Hal B. Heaton. (See R. 68.) Therefore, in accord with the general
usage at the hearing, the process of arriving at a single value from the three
separate methods will be referred to as "weighting" or "reconciliation." "Correlation" will be used to refer the statistical process of studying whether one or
more variable quantities is statistically related, or "correlated," to other variable
quantities.
-10-

ing that was given to the three methods by the Tax Commission. Clearly, the Tax
Commission must have prescribed—either explicitly or implicitly—some relative
weight to the three components in order or arrive at a composite result of $296
million. Thus, the questions are: Can we discern the relative weighting used by
the Commission and, if so, is it compatible with the evidence, the Commission's
prior practice, and with reasoned decision-making under the UAPA?

I. THE COMMISSION HAS PROVIDED NO
INDICATION OF HOW IT ARRIVED AT ITS
FINAL ASSESSMENT OF $296 MILLION.
In another case involving the State Tax Commission, this Court previously
found:
figures."

"Nothing in the record indicates how the Tax Commission arrived at the
First National, 799 P.2d at 1165.

This statement could have been

written to apply to the Commission's December 3 decision in this case. Although
the decision dedicates two paragraphs that ostensibly support its conclusion that
the FMV of Questar's system is $296 million, a closer look shows that there is no
indication of the derivation of this number, nor any connection of this final number to the specific facts in the record. As will be discussed in Parts II-V of this
argument, the position of the Property Tax Division was that the evaluation should
be $300 million, notwithstanding that this recommendation did not correspond in
any logical way with the underlying, stipulated values for the three evaluation
methods used for the Company's property. Questar's evidence, on the other hand,
-11-

supported a FMV evaluation in the range of $231 million. (R. 93.)
The Commission's result doesn't correspond to any witness's recommendation nor to either party's position. The discussion on page 4 of the December 3
decision states only broad, general conclusions that (1) give the taxpayer or a
reviewing court no logical pathway from the evidence presented to the conclusions
reached, and (2) do not, in material respects, comport with the evidence.
Paragraph 8 of the "Findings of Fact" of the Commission's December 3
Decision provides the only analysis of the evidence:12
The Tax Commission finds that in a case such as this, the
market and income approaches to value are more reflective of actual
market conditions than is the cost approach to value. This is because
the cost approach is generally considered in the appraisal profession
as a reliable indicator of value only when sufficient data and conditions are not present for the other two approaches. In this case,
there is a more than sufficient amount of data to support a valuation
based upon the market and income approaches. While the cost
approach may appear to some, in a strict mathematical sense, to be
more technically correct, it does not necessarily follow that that
approach is also the most reflective of actual market conditions.
Market values do not always conform to precise mathematical formulations.
This "analysis" consists only of conclusory statements that are either circular or not found in the record. In particular, the Commission's primary conclusion appears to be based on the statement that "[T]he cost approach is generally
considered in the appraisal profession as a reliable indicator of the value only

12

Paragraph 2 of the "Conclusions of Law" provides the only other analysis; it
is discussed in Part IV.
-12-

when sufficient data and conditions are not present for the other two approaches."
There is no record evidence to support any claim about "the appraisal profession,"
much less this specific conclusion.

No witness testified to such a conclusion.

But, more importantly, it does not address the fundamentals of the various approaches. That is, it does not in any way dispose of the indisputable facts surrounding the limitations placed on Questar by the imposition of FERC-determined
rates that are based on providing a reasonable return on the basis of depreciated
original costs—the cost method.
To fail to address this foundational matter is not reliance on "relevant
evidence that is adequate to convince a reasonable mind to support a conclusion."
First National, 799 P. 2d at 1165. It is true that the Property Tax Division sponsored witnesses that claimed that the cost indicator should not be weighted very
heavily (in one instance, that it and the income method should not be considered at
all), but this does not end the inquiry. Questar understands that it must "marshall
all of the evidence supporting the findings and show that despite the supporting
facts, and in light of the conflicting or contradictory evidence, the findings are not
supported by substantial evidence." Grace Drilling Company v. Board of Review,
776 P.2d 63, 68 (Utah 1989). But a fair evaluation of the evidence, as it relates
to the cost method, shows that all witnesses recognize that a prospective buyer of
a rate-regulated company such as Questar would be mindful of and affected by the
rate limitations placed on the company by such an agency. (R. 140, 206-08, 230).
-13-

The direct analysis of the treatment of the cost method will be addressed in
detail in Part II of this brief, and it will show that, not only did the Commission
fail to provide any roadmap that led to its conclusion of $296 million, this result
cannot be reconciled with the facts facing a rate-regulated company such as
Questar.
Further, to suggest that "there is more than a sufficient amount of data to
support an evaluation based on the market and income approaches" is a conclusion
that is devoid of any substantive analysis. First, no witness so testified.

Second,

the amount of data is not relevant; what is relevant is the quality of the data. And
the evidence, when the record is viewed as a whole, does not permit the conclusion that the market and income approaches are more reliable or more likely to
measure the FMV of the company—no matter how much data there is.
The Commission also offers the logic that, even if the cost/rate-base approach is "in a strict mathematical sense, [ ] more technically correct," it still can
reject the cost method because "it does not necessarily follow that that approach is
also the most reflective of actual market conditions." The Commission attempts
to parlay this somewhat irrelevant conclusion into the converse, which does not
follow—namely, that the cost approach does not reflect actual market conditions.
Indeed, the overwhelming evidence is that a knowledgeable, potential buyer will
be highly aware of the basis upon which the FERC determines the rates that
determine the pipeline's cash flow or income stream—that is, the depreciated
-14-

original cost or rate base. (R. 89-91, 207-08, 229, 235-36.) The Commission's
implication that an attempt to analyze the problem that faces an appraiser by
mathematical methods automatically produces inaccurate or inapplicable results is
simply not reasonable.
Finally, the Commission's statement in paragraph 9 that "stock and debt
approach tests the reliability of the other two approaches" is completely devoid of
any record support. No witness addressed this point, and there is no evidence to
support it. The goal is to measure Questar's FMV, and methods must be used or
rejected, in whole or in part, on their merits. The Commission's conclusion does
not pass the test of the UAPA and First National}3

For these reasons, as well

as the more detailed examination of the Commission's rejection of the cost method
discussed in Part II below, the Commission's December 3 decision does not
comport with the UAPA and its interpretation under the Grace Drilling and First
National cases.

13

In addition, the stipulation precluded the parties from advancing this if-tworesults-are-close-they-must-be-right argument: "[N]either party will advance any
argument . . . that emphasizes or relies on the relative difference between the
income and stock-and-debt methods to imply or conclude that the cost method is
inferior or superior . . . ." (R. 381, f 1(c).)
-15-

II. THE COMMISSION'S APPARENT REJECTION14
OF THE COST METHOD FOR DETERMINING
FAIR MARKET VALUE IS NOT SUPPORTED
BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE WHEN VIEWED
IN LIGHT OF THE WHOLE RECORD.
The Commission has relegated the cost method to a minimal (or non-existent) role in the determination of Questar's FMV. Other than indicating that "the
cost approach is generally considered in the appraisal profession as a reliable
indicator of value only when sufficient data and conditions are not present for the
other two approaches," the Commission did not address the merits of the cosi
method in the context of the facts of the case. First, the record does not suppor
this conclusion—no witness testified about what is "generally considered in the
appraisal profession."

Second, the implication that "sufficient data and condi

tions" are "present for the other two approaches" does not establish any defensible
rationale for ignoring the cost method.

The naked proclamation of conclusion*

does not entitle an agency to the deference that might be accorded to specia
expertise.

See, e.g., Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co. v. FERC, No. 89-1785 (D.C

Cir., Mar. 5, 1991) (1991 WestLaw 26684).15

Here the UAPA requires more

One of the difficulties with this argument from the outset is the lack o;
explanation for the Commission's finding of a $296 million valuation. Thus
Questar is reduced for some of its arguments to characterizing the Commission'*
actions as "apparent," because the Commission's final decision does not articulate
the Commission's derivation. See Part I, supra.
15

"[T]he notion of lawfulness requires insistence that the chosen frameworl
not collapse in practice into a standardless exercise of Commission discretioi
resting on no more than an assertion of 'expertise'." Tennessee Gas, slip op. a
-16-

than a two-paragraph disposition that does little more than state conclusions that,
at in material part, do not conform to evidence.
As in the First National case, "nothing in the record indicates how the Tax
Commission arrived at the figures" for its final evaluation. 799 P.2d at 1165. As
discussed in Part I above, this shortcoming, almost per se, renders the Tax Commission's decision to be incompatible with § 63-46b-16(4)(g).
But the Commission's shortcoming is more substantive than a simple failure
to assign weights directly to the three methods and provide a rationale for the
choice. The brief discussion of findings in paragraphs 8 and 9 of the December 3
order do not reasonably reflect the evidence when viewed as a whole.

Questar

does not claim that no witness testified that the cost method should be assigned
little or no weight, but a rational consideration of the evidence taken as a whole
would not permit a reasonable person with knowledge of the field to draw the
Commission's conclusions.
In order to evaluate the Commission's treatment of the cost method under
the standard of the UAPA, it is necessary to review the evidence in some detail.
It was undisputed that Questar's revenues are totally determined by the rates and
charges established by the FERC. (R. 29, 138.) Further, it is fundamental law
that these rates and charges are based on the premise that a rate-regulated compa-

6, citing Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 850-52 (D.C.
Cir. 1970).
-17-

ny is entitled to a return on its investment base that is commensurate with returns
on investments of comparable risks and sufficient to maintain credit and attract
necessary capital. F.P.C. v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591 (1944); Bluefield Water Works & Improvement Co. v. PSC, 262 U.S. 679, 692-93 (1923)16;
see also Utah Power & Light Co. v. PSC, 152 P.2d 542, 568 (Utah 1944). The
amount on which an investor is entitled to earn a reasonable return is the rate
base, which is, with minor adjustment, the same as the result produced by the cost
method in this proceeding. (R. 30-31, see also 165.)
Therefore, the owner or purchaser of Questar is constrained to an income
that is designed to produce a fair rate of return on the investment value determined by the cost method used in property-tax evaluation.

(R. 89-91.) In other

words, a willing buyer of Questar would need to be content with the expectation
that he will receive a net-income stream that produces a reasonable return based
on the rate base—the value determined by the cost method.
One demonstrative way to look at this as to assume for a moment that the
cost/rate-base method for a rate-regulated company such as Questar is $200
million and that the agency regulating its rates has permitted an overall rate of

16

The age of these cases makes them no less authoritative. They continue to
form the foundation for nearly any analysis of the lawfulness of the return component of utility-type ratemaking.
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return of 10%, 17 which, by law, would be comparable to overall returns available on other investments of similar risk. This would produce an annual return of
$20 million to the owner. If, on the other hand, it is claimed that the "fair market
value" of the property is $300 million, a hypothetical purchaser at this price
would still be constrained by the rate-regulation agency to charge rates that would
produce

$20

million;

$300 -s- $20 = 6.67%.

thus,

the

purchaser's

rate

of

return

would

be

It is hard to see why any potential, rational investor

would make such a commitment. If he can obtain an average return of 10% on an
investment of comparable risk (as required by Hope and Bluefield), then he would
be foolish to buy this company to obtain 6.67%. Yet, that is the behavior attributed to the potential "willing buyer . . . having reasonable knowledge of the relevant facts" by the Commission's rejection of the cost method and acceptance of
methods that yield a much higher valuation.
The Commission's likely response is to claim that this demonstration is
mere opinion and that there was contrary opinion expressed by other witnesses at
the hearing. But it is not enough that there is a contrary opinion expressed. The
UAPA requires that the record as a whole be considered, and the Commission
provides no rational explanation why the FMV would be 41% above the rate-

The "weighted cost of capital," taking into account debt, preferred stock and
common stock. See R. 247 [Ex. 2] and Mr. Darrell Hanson's explanation of this
concept at R. 43-44, 54-59, 248 [Ex. 3].
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base/cost method [($296 - $210) + $210 = 41%], when the buyer is limited to
income available from depreciated original-cost rate-base regulation by the
FERC. 18
To conclude that Questar's FMV is significantly more than its rate base is
to directly presume that something else would compensate a purchaser for the
shortfall in regulated return if he were to pay more than the rate base on which
the pipeline is entitled to earn a return. No evidence of this kind was presented.
In the absence of such evidence, there must be far greater weight placed on the
cost/rate-base method for determining Questar's FMV. 19
Several courts have considered this question in detail and, under conditions
that are very close to the ones before the Court in this case, have found that
rejection of the evidence supporting a cost/rate-base methcxi is not reasonable
under standards similar to those in the UAPA.
This issue has been carefully analyzed by the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts in Boston Edison Co. v. Board of Assessors, 439 N.E. 2d 763, 387

18

Mr. Hanson, a manager with the Division of Public Utilities of the Utah
Department of Commerce, gave a detailed explanation of the process used by the
FERC to determine the rates that Questar can charge for its services and thereby
produce an income stream. (R. 42-59.)
19

Indeed, one of the Property Tax Division's witness's put his finger right on
the reason that the regulator's (FERC's) valuation is so nearly dispositive of the
FMV: "[I]n the regulated market, the regulator's goal is to take [the] place of the
marketplace with respect to a monopoly." (R. 235, testimony of Michael W.
Goodwin.)
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Mass. 298 (1982).

Although the methodology "competing" with the cost/rate-

base method was different from the ones here, the question was the same:
u

[W]hether in determining the fair cash value20 of the property, the board's de-

cision to grant almost complete weight to the depreciated reproduction cost of
Edison's property is supported on the record."

Id. at 766. The Massachusetts

court found the assessors' assignment of 5% weight to cost the rate-base method
wasn't supported by the record and that:
[T]he board did not indicate a reasonable basis in logic for ignoring
almost entirely the fact that a potential buyer, if it were a public
utility, would be considerably influenced by the return to which it
would be limited on whatever investment it made. If property is
known to be subject to . . . a governmentally-imposed restriction
affecting its value or its earning power, that fact should be considered in any determination of its fair cash value.
Id. at 767 (emphasis added).
The Massachusetts court could see no reason why a willing buyer would
purchase property on which it could expect to obtain an annual return well below
that available on other similar investments—5.2% versus 9.5%. Id. at 768 and
765 n.4. The analogous consideration in this case would be to compare the rate
of return available on the agreed-on rate base of $210 million with the rate that
would be obtained from the same income on an investment base of $296 million, a

20

The Massachusetts court defined this term as "the price that an owner
willing but not compelled to sell ought to receive from one willing but not compelled to buy." Id. at 766. This is equivalent to Utah's FMV.
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difference of almost 41 %.
No less applicable to Questar's case is the Boston Edison conclusion: "As
long as the standard to be applied is fair cash value, however, the record must
show why a willing buyer would reasonably be expected to pay the value placed
on the property by the board."

Id. at 769. In Questar's case, there is no evi-

dence to show why a buyer would value the property 41% above what would
otherwise produce a competitive rate of return on his investment. The undisputed
evidence is that an investor is constrained to the returns obtained from the rates
set by the FERC—rates that are determined by the company's rate base.
It is also important to note that, as a general matter of law, rate-regulated
facilities that are bought by another company will not be allowed to valued for
rate purposes at an amount greater than the original depreciated cost rate base,
even though a higher price may have been paid in the marketplace.

See, e.g.,

Montana Power Co. v. FERC, 599 F.2d 295 (9th Cir. 1979) (no increase in rate
base allowed upon transfer in order to prevent consumers from paying twice for
the same asset).
The words of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court could apply just as
well to the proceeding before this Court:

21

To obtain some perspective, a 10% overall return on Questar's rate base is
conservative and would produce $21 million in return on $210 million, but if this
return is compared with the Commission's valuation of $296 million, the rate of
return would only be 7.1 %.
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Although the Board [Tax Commission] acknowledges that a public
utility buyer of Edison's [Questar's] property would be limited to a
fair return on Edison's [Questar's] net book cost, it nowhere explains, by references to substantial evidence or to reasoned principle,
why a buyer would want to pay more than Edison's [Questar's] net
book value, when by investing the same dollars elsewhere that buyer
could obtain a better return.
Boston Edison, 439 N.E.2d at 768; see also Montaup Electric Co. v. Board of
Assessors, 460 N.E.2d 583 (Mass. 1984) (taxing board had disregarded credible
evidence of rate base value); State ex rel. Wisconsin River Power Co. v. Board of
Review, 370 N.W. 2d 580 (Wis. Ct. App. 1985) (board had insufficient evidence
that a buyer could reasonably be expected to pay more than FERC rate base).
The Massachusetts court went on to summarize: "[T]he record must show
why a willing buyer would reasonably be expected to pay the value placed on the
property by the Board. The record in this case does not do so." 439 N.E.2d at
769. So, too, for the case before this Court.
Another comprehensive discussion of a similar situation is found in a
California trial-court case, which, although clearly not precedential or binding on
this Court, provides a thoughtful, independent judicial analysis of the problem. In
AT&T Communications of California v. State Board of Equalization, No. 500802
(Cal. Super. Ct., Co. of Sacramento, Dept. 24, Feb. 1, 1991), slip op. at 10, the
trial judge found:
Rate base is a measure of what the regulators deem to be the capital
at work. . . . The purchaser of regulated utility property must live
in the same regulatory environment and would expect to earn only
-23-

the same return on rate base. Since the purchaser of utility property
must be presumed to have other investment opportunities available to
him, it would not be logical to assume that a purchaser would accept
a lower return by buying utility property at a price higher than rate
base when higher returns would be available elsewhere.22
Questar does not take the view that the cost/rate-base method is, by itself,
dispositive of the appraisal, nor that the rate base "caps" the value that can be
used to assess property taxes. Rather, the evidence concerning the applicability
and reliability of the methods must be reasonably analyzed to yield a result that is
supported by substantial evidence when the record is viewed as a whole.
The Company engaged an expert consultant, Prof. Hal B. Heaton, then a
visiting professor at Harvard Business School, to analyze the problem and determine appropriate weights to be given to the methods, taking into account that the
Company is rate-regulated by the FERC on the basis of the depreciated originalcost rate base.
Prof. Heaton conducted an analytic investigation of the information that was
available in this case. His analysis, as set forth in Exhibit 5 (R. 253-64), provides
a firm foundation to an otherwise subjective area.

In particular, his attempt to

find the most reliable estimate of FMV by evaluating the relative reliability of the
three individual methods did not eliminate the non-cost methods, but did relegate
them to a lesser role—not by subjective, standardless judgment, but by an analytic

A copy of this case has been attached as Addendum B to the brief.
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approach that recognized, among other things, the rate-regulation process conducted by the FERC. (R. 90, 117.)
In sum, even when the evidence supporting the Commission's result is
marshalled, it is hard to see that a reasonable mind would ignore, or relegate to
such minimal significance, the constraining financial effects of operating under
FERC rate regulation. Yet, that is the effect of the Commission's final determination.

III. THE COMMISSION'S LEVEL OF RELIANCE ON THE
STOCK-AND-DEBT METHOD IS NOT A RATIONAL
INTERPRETATION OF THE EVIDENCE AND IS CONTRARY
TO THE COMMISSION'S PRIOR POLICY IN NORTHWEST
PIPELINE CORP. V. PROPERTY TAX DIVISION.
The stock-and-debt method is founded on the theory that a company whose
common equity securities are publicly traded can be evaluated by combining the
open-market value of publicly traded equity securities with the value of the outstanding debt of the company. Questar does not necessarily dispute that this method may have some application if the underlying assumptions are satisfied—namely, that the equity securities of the company whose property is to be assessed are
publicly traded. However, in this case, there is no dispute that Questar (1) is a
second-tier subsidiary of a publicly traded company, (2) has no publicly traded
equity securities of its own, and (3) constitutes a minority part of a diversified
corporate family.
-25-

Accordingly, any attempt to ascribe a value to Questar through the stockand-debt method will necessarily require an allocation or attribution from the
publicly-traded corporate parent or estimates of other "comparable" companies.
There was extensive evidence indicating that Questar Pipeline forms a
minority portion of Questar Corporation and that there is no agreed-on method for
allocating a portion of the stock-and-debt value of the parent to the pipeline company. Attempts to determine the percentage of the parent that the pipeline operations account for produced an indisputably wide range of results, as indicated by
Mr. Jackson, Prof. Heaton and Mr. Prawitt. (R. 27-28, 103-04, 199-200.) For
example, if the corporate value is assumed to be $621,341,000, 23 attempts to
value the pipeline subsidiary range from $189 million to $317 million, depending
on what financial index is used. (R. 260, R 86.) As Prof. Heaton pointed out,
this suggests a very low level of reliability of this method. (R. 70-72.)
In addition to its attempt to determine the pipeline's value as a percentage
of its parent, the Property Tax Division also used so-called "comparables."
(R. 88.) These are companies that are presumably similar to Questar through one
or more economic or financial indices, and their value is ascribed in some way to
that of Questar. Prof. Heaton observed that, because they rely on characteristics

23

This value is not explicitly stated in the evidence; it is implicit in Prof.
Heaton's discussion of the Property Tax Division's attempt to allocation a portion
of the corporate parent to the pipeline company. (R. 260.) E.g., $188,825,681
- 30.39% = $621,341,497.
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of other, diversified companies, such methods also have high variability and are
relatively unreliable as indicators of the direct market value of Questar.

(R. 86-

87.) Thus, there are major difficulties in finding a logical or rational chain from
the value of the parent to that of a minority second-tier subsidiary. Even Division
witness Hanke, who espoused 100% reliance on the stock-and-debt method,
admitted that it "should be relied upon in making valuations whenever the stock
and debt is actively tradefd]." (R. 128, emphasis added.) This condition does not
exist in the Questar case, and no amount of fancy footwork could leave a reasonable mind convinced that the problem introduced by the minority nature of
Questar can be reliably dealt with.
Indeed, the very Commission that has endorsed the stock-and-debt method
for Questar found that the same method was inappropriate for another interstate,
FERC-regulated pipeline company that was a second-tier subsidiary of a parent.
In Northwest Pipeline Corp. v. Property Tax Division, Appeal Nos. 85-0074 and
86-0255 (Utah Tax Comm'n, Dec. 21, 1987),24 the Commission concluded:
[I]t is very difficult to determine what portion of the stock and debt of
The Williams Company [parent] should be allocated to Petitioner
[Northwest Pipeline Corporation]. Further, there is no specific
information available concerning the market value of the non-public
stock. Because of the difficulties associated with accurately allocating a portion of the equity value of the parent company's non-publicly traded stock to Petitioners, two tiers down, we find that the stock

24

The Northwest Pipeline case is included as Addendum C.
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and debt indicator is the least reliable of the three traditional indicators and will be given little, if any, weight.
Northwest Pipeline, slip op. at 6 (emphasis added). The focus of this conclusion
is well-reasoned—there are insurmountable difficulties in the allocation process.
It is true that the parent of Northwest Pipeline Corporation was not publicly
traded, which may have complicated the problem further.

But the Commission's

analysis centered first on the inability to allocate a portion of the parent company's value to a company two tiers down. This problem is no less present for
Questar as a second-tier, minority subsidiary of Questar Corporation than it was
for Northwest Pipeline. To treat two interstate pipelines that are in nearly congruent situations does not comport with the arbitrary-and-capricious standards of
UAPA § 63-46b-16(4)(h)(iv).
Division witness Eckhardt Prawitt recognized this relative problem when he
testified that he would be inclined to weight the stock-and-debt indicator much
higher if the subsidiary to be evaluated was as much as 90% of the size of the
corporate parent.

(R. 168.) The corollary to this concession is that the smaller

the percentage, the more difficult it is to ascribe the characteristics of the parent to
that of the subsidiary through a reasonable allocation (much less the characteristics
of other diversified companies).
Prof. Heaton incorporated this very high degree of variability in his analysis, but he did not reject the method out of hand. He merely took account of the
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low level of reliability that every witness who testified on this subject was forced
to recognize.

Even Prof. Hanke, who thought that the stock-and-debt indicator

was the be-all for estimating FMV, admitted that there were subjective allocation
problems in a case of this kind. (R. 143-45, 156.)
Although the Commission purports to distinguish Questar from Northwest
Pipeline in the application of the stock-and-debt method, there is no substantial
distinction.

The allocation problems identified in the Northwest discussion are

equally applicable to Questar. That the Williams Company is not publicly traded
simply provides an additional level of complication.

IV. THE COMMISSION'S APPARENT RELIANCE ON
THE INCOME METHOD DOES NOT COMPORT WITH
THE UNCONTROVERTED EVIDENCE THAT THE
INCOME METHOD IN THIS CASE IS EQUIVALENT
TO THE STOCK-AND-DEBT METHOD.
Without specifying underlying reasons, the Commission has declared that
the "income approach is the most reliable" of the methods.

The December 3

order does not explain why this is so, it specifically does not explain why this
indicator measures what a willing buyer and willing seller would agree to as the
value of Questar Pipeline Company. It also does not address the critical issue of
the relationship between the income and stock-and-debt indicators, as used by the
parties. In fact, the Commission's declaration does not indicate to what extent it
considered—if at all—the demonstration of Prof. Heaton that the two methods are
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functionally equivalent, with minor computational differences.
In his attempt to analyze the reliability question carefully, Prof. Heaton
undertook a careful, analytic approach to the problem of determining, as reliably
as possible under the circumstances surrounding Questar, the most likely FMV of
its property. Although the Commission order largely ignores the analysis because
of its perception that property tax appraisals are a matter of judgment, it is evidence that must be considered—especially when substantial portions of it are not
disputed.
The thrust of Prof. Heaton's development is that, as a statistical matter, the
Tax Commission is looking for the most reliable, most likely estimator of the
FMV.

It must, therefore, give due consideration to the relative dependence or

independence of the individual estimators and to their individual reliability and
likely variation from the true values.

Because there has been no recent pur-

chase/sale of Questar, it is recognized that any of these methods are inherently
approximate, and a reasoned synthesis of the information must recognize the
strengths and shortcomings of the methods.
Prof. Heaton derived a statistical model (a model with which no one took
any exception) that sought to minimize the statistical variance of the ultimate result
as a function of the likely reliability and dependence of the three individual estimators. (R. 253-64 [Ex. 5].)
A key ingredient of Prof. Heaton's analysis was the demonstration that the
-30-
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less likely to produce the right answer than the other, thui the proper calculations
would be to assign, 50% * eight, to each, of methods A and, B (or Q , w itli a, sub

stantially different result: .50 x ($200 + $300) = $250. 25
In the case before the Commission, method B was analogous to the "income" method and method C, the stock-and-debt method.26

Prof. Heaton's

analysis incorporated this equivalence, and his mathematical model took it into account. He did not ignore the other methods; he simply reflected their quality and
close statistical correlation.

No witness disputed his derivation nor his proof of

the income/stock-and-debt equivalence.

Prof. Heaton's approach provided a

sound and analytic basis on which to evaluate the information that is available to
the Commission to determine Questar's FMV, but the Commission ignored this
evidence entirely—a result that is in conflict with § 63-46b-16(4)(g) of the UAPA.
Having ignored it, the Commission then compounded the error by claiming that
"the stock and debt approach tests the reliability of the other two approaches."
(R. 9.)

A method that is a clone of a method can hardly be used to test the

reliability of that method.

Prof. Heaton discusses this effect in somewhat more technical terms.
(R. 72.)
26

There are minor differences between the two methods, but Prof. Heaton has
shown that their fundamental underpinnings are exactly the same. Minor computational differences only serve to reduce slightly the level of statistical correlation
from 1.0 to something lower. (R. 88.) Prof. Heaton at one point assigned a
statistical correlation of .85 to the two methods to account for these minor differences. (R. 92.)
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V A \N ARM OF THE TAX COMMISSION, THE
PROPERTY TAX DIVISION, HAS BEEN ARBITRARY
AND CAPRICIOUS IN ITS EVALUATION OF
QUESTAR'S FAIR MARKET VALUE; ANY COMMISSION
RELIANCE ON THE DIVISION'S RECOMMENDATION
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^ / P O R T E D BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.
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ing, and they are not consistent with the requirements of the UAPA.
Perhaps the best way to demonstrate the elusiveness of the Division's approach to tax assessment is to refer to Exhibit 1, which is a summary of the
various values that were in consideration at different times during the life of this
proceeding.
(a)
Preliminary
Assessment

(b)
Official
Assess't

(c)
Discovery
Response

(d)
Stipulated
Values

Cost Method
Income Method
Stock and Debt

$219
300
362

$210
303
340

$220
310
340

$210
303
312

Division's
Weighted Value

$300

$300

$292

$300

TABLE A 28
($ in millions)
What Exhibit 1 shows is that the Property Tax Division has no coherent,
consistent theory of assigning weights to the individual methods as applied to
Questar.

There seems to be little or no rational connection that links the three

component methods to the final appraisal.
As indicated in column (a) of Exhibit 1, at the beginning of the proceeding,
the Property Tax Division reconciled the three values $219/300/362 to get $300

28

Partial replication of Exhibit 1 (R. 245). $300 million in column (d) is from
Mr. Prawitt's testimony. (R. 172-73.)
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million as a preliminary assessment.

No indication of the relative weights of

thrsc numbers was ever given to Questar.
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implicitly engineered to produce the overall $300 million that was contained in the

This was submitted to Qucstai on April 7, 1988.
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preliminary assessment.30
More inconsistency arises when column (c) of Exhibit 1 is examined. This
column shows the values calculated by the Property Tax Division at a later time.
When the Division responded to Questar's interrogatories, it provided workpapers
that indicated its calculation of the three methods to be $220/310/340 millions,
with a weighted value of $292 million.31 At the hearing, Mr. Prawitt could not
explain why these numbers were different from those calculated previously by the
Division, except that he had taken "another closer look." 32 (R. 172-73.)
The next, and last, set of values that demonstrates the unreliability of the
evidence presented by the Division is its treatment of the stipulated values of
$210/303/312 millions. With these values, the Property Tax Division returned to
its position that the proper estimate of the fair market value of Questar is $300

30

Commissioner Davis seemed to pick up on this notion at one point in the
proceedings. (R. 185-88.)
3

interrogatory no. 1 was:
Provide all workpapers and other documents used to appraise
Questar Pipeline Company for 1988. (Copies of tables, charts and
workpapers already supplied to Questar Pipeline need not be duplicated.) Include a description of all assumptions for each of the three
methods that were used to produce an appraised value. In particular,
please provide all information necessary to replicate the results
reached by the Property Tax Division (the Division) for the three
methods that were used (cost, income and market).

(R. 314-15 [Ex. 9].)
32

This closer look is dated May 11, 1989 (R. 318), yet it was not supplied to
Questar until June 1990 in response to the discovery request.
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million. (R. 1 72.) A casual glance at these results indicates a level of inconsis
tency that simply cannot be reconciled. To focus on this lack of consistency, two
specific comparisons arc pailn, ml.til", il'liislutne.
parison °f columns (a) and (d) again shows the Commission's Prop
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We are reduced to these kinds of exercises because the Commission has, as
discussed at length in Part I of this argument, provided no explicit explanation of
how it treated all this evidence, what weights it assigned, or how P arrived at
$296 million.
34

.22 x 214 i 50 v 100 i ?S x 362 = 300, (A simple algebraic calculation provides this result.)
35

.22 x 210 + .50 x 303 •+ .28 x 312 = 285.
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would be bound to a lower value than $296 million.36

If not, it is a mystery

what evidence the Commission relied on.
Even more inexplicable is the comparison between columns (c) and (d).
Column (c) shows the Division's composite result to be $292 million.37 In column (d), every one of the three stipulated component values is less that the Division's previous valuations in column (c), yet the Division's recommendation,
articulated by Mr. Prawitt, increased back to $300 million.

Other than pure

caprice, it is difficult to draw any other conclusion except that the Property Tax
Division did not honor the factual stipulation entered into by the parties.

The

cross-examination of Mr. Prawitt suggests as much. (R. 176-78.) Indeed, nothing in Mr. Prawitt's testimony indicates that there was any analysis by the Division of the composite assessment in light of the stipulated values for the three
methods. Such capricious behavior is not consonant with principles of equitable
treatment of the taxpayer and the strictures of the UAPA.
Mr. Prawitt's testimony concerning the weightings to be used is not credible evidence upon which an agency can reasonably rely, and the Commission's

36

Quite apart from the shortcomings discussed in Parts II, III and IV of this
argument.
37

The Division's counsel's claim that the $292 million response to Questar
Pipeline Interrogatory was in the nature of a "settlement" is simply incorrect.
(R. 180-81.) The interrogatory and its response speak for themselves, and there
isn't the slightest hint that these were settlement numbers.
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apparent reliance, at least in part, on this evidence is error under any reasonable
standard of agency review and, a fortiori, under the IJAPA.
Typk.;. oi uk
{C-;U
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F o r example,

ir -1 :jialogij* with counsel: •
n

Y ou indicated about 15% to the cost method, about 3 0 to
4 0 % to the stock and debt method, and the rest to the income.
Is that correct?

A

ir\ \:« Prawitt) ~
sounds about right
thing different no i - m , because

T may say some

(

coherent approach to ihu inipoiiaiit taa*. wi weighting the information contained in
the three e\ aluatiori niethods and could not offer any explanation for the apparently inconsi.Si. ;.;
example

... .

.

estimate

I 'I 1 \

! 1 5 1 "9 7 ) I "; :)i:

uoss-examination, mi. x'lawitt later gave tentative assent to a

different weighting—20/60/20%, oi le which is consistei it w ith the (rather wide)
ranges given in the answer to interrogatory no.
notwithstanding sin h assignments IIIIII the 15-20% range to the cost method, at
another point in his testimony, he proclaimed he had m faith in (he cost indicator
(although he gave no reason lor this disavowal I ml I'I" I
At si II jiMi'thf i (mini In- testified ilmf iln1 iml\ in dicator he had any faith in
was the stock-and-debt indicator.

""The stipulated values I -you know -the only

-39-

one I really have any faith in is the stock and debt indicator." (R. 188.) This, of
course, is not consistent with the rest of his testimony. And later still, he opined
that he had changed his mind during this case about the relative reliability of the
cost method as a result of "the Northwest Pipeline decision38 a number of years
ago." (R. 189.) But the Northwest decision had been decided and issued by the
Commission in 1987—before this case began in early 1988.
This illustrates the taxpayer's frustration in dealing with an arm of an
agency that offers a moving target.

The taxpayer has been unable to determine

exactly what its property-tax responsibilities are and the basis on which its taxes
are being determined. Such treatment does not pass muster under the UAPA, as it
is arbitrary and capricious. A reasonable person would not expect to be subjected
to a tax-determination process that presented such a moving target with no standards. This, indeed, is the "standardless exercise" that the D.C. Circuit Court of
Appeals discussed in remanding the recent Tennessee Gas case to the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission.39
In short, the evidence sponsored by the Division to support its $300 million
assessment is fraught with inconsistencies and implausible assertions.

Any reli-

ance on such evidence is not reasonable under the standards of the UAPA.

38

A reference to Northwest Pipeline Corp. v. Property Tax Division, Nos.
85-0074 and 86-0255 (Utah Tax Comm'n, Dec. 21, 1987).
39

See note 15, supra.
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rate

making

Energy

and

other

Regulatory

regulatory

Commission

functions

(FERC).

of

At

the Federal

the

time

of

assessment, Petitioner was a wholly-owned subsidiary of Entrada
Industries, which was
Corporation.

This

a wholly-owned

made

the

subsidiary

Petitioner

subsidiary to Questar Corporation.

a

of

Questar

second

level

Petitioner has no publicly

held securities, whereas Questar Corporation is publicly held.
During

the

period

in

question,

Petitioner

constituted

approximately 29% of the total plant property and equipment of
Questar Corporation.

Petitioner's revenues were approximately

33% of the total gross revenues of Questar Corporation and
Petitioner's

payroll

was

approximately

20%

of

Questar

Corporation's total payroll.
4.

In

a

stipulation

entered

into

between

the

parties, dated September 29, 1989, the parties agreed that the
three approaches to value for the Petitioner's property are
those known as the "cost method," the "income approach," and
the "market (or stock-and-debt) method."

The parties agreed

further that the values per each of these methods for the year
in question are as follows:
a.

Cost approach:

$210,492r693.

b.

Income method:

$303/000,000.

c.

Market (or
stock-and-debt)
method:

5.

$312,321,375.

The single remaining issue, which is the subject

of this case, is the correlation or reconciliation of the three
values

as

determined

in the different

approaches, as just

-2-
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outlined, from which

a single

assessed

valuation is to be

determined for the entire company.
6.

It

is the

Petitioner's

position

that

a 78.8%

weight should be placed upon a cost method of valuation with
10.6% being placed upon each of the other two approaches.

When

these weights are applied to the stipulated values, then the
correlation renders a result of $231,000,000 as Petitioner's
value

for

approach

its property.
is

the

most

Petitioner

applicable

to

asserts

that

Petitioner's

the

cost

situation

because FERC regulations set the rate base on the depreciated
cost of Petitioner's facilities.
Dr.

Hal

B.

Heaton,

Petitioner's expert witness,

presented

a

technically

oriented,

statistical analysis in support of Petitioner's position and in
an effort to attack Respondent's analysis.

Petitioner

feels

that the cost approach is more objective and analytical than
the income or market sales approaches and is therefore a more
reliable indicator of market value.
7.

It

methods are not

is Respondent's

position

that

Dr. Heaton's

in accord with the established and accepted

principles and practices of the appraisal profession and that
his estimates

are based

upon his own judgments, which are

subjective and are not as objective as Dr. Heaton asserts.
Respondent states that the quality of the data available, as
well as the strengths and weaknesses of each approach, are what
should determine the weighting to be given to each approach in
the final correlation of value.

Respondent feels that in this

case, the market and income approaches more accurately reflect
the conditions of the market than does Petitioner's approach,
-3-
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which depends on a mechanical, mathematical weighting that does
not

reflect

market.

the

fluctuations

and

conditions

of

the

actual

Based upon these facts, Respondent, in placing more

weight on the market and income approaches to value than the
cost

approach, renders

a correlated

value

for

the

subject

properties of approximately $300,000,000.
8.
this,

the

reflective
approach

The Tax Commission finds that in a case such as
market
of

to

and

actual

value.

income
market

This

approaches

to value

are more

conditions

than

the

is because

the

is

cost

cost

approach

is

generally considered in the appraisal profession as a reliable
indicator of value only when sufficient data and conditions are
not present for the other two approaches.

In this case, there

is a more than sufficient amount of data to support a valuation
based upon the market and income approaches.

While the cost

approach may appear to some, in a strict mathematical sense, to
be more technically correct, it does not necessarily follow
that that approach is also the most reflective of actual market
conditions.

Market values do not always conform to precise

mathematical formulations.
9.

The Tax Commission finds, therefore, based upon

the evidence before it, that the cost approach is the least
reliable and the income approach is the most

reliable.

The

stock and debt approach tests the reliability of the other two
approaches.

In applying these principles to the facts of this

case, it is the opinion of the Commission that the correlated
value is $296,000,000.
-4-
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The Tax Commission

is required to oversee the

just administration of property taxes to ensure that property
is valued for tax purposes according to fair market value.
(Utah Code Ann. §59-1-210(7).)
2.

Petitioner takes the position that the market (or

stock-and-debt) method should not be used in this case where
Petitioner is a second tier subsidiary of Questar Corporation.
Petitioner

cites Northwest Pipeline Corporation vs. Property

Tax Division of the Utah State Tax Commission, Appeal Numbers
85-0074 and 86-0255 (Utah Tax Commission 1987) in support of
this position.

Page six of that decision states as follows:

The stock and debt indicator of value is
difficult
to
apply to the Petitioner.
Petitioner is a wholly owned subsidiary of
the Williams Company, a privately owned,
non-public
corporation.
The
parent
corporation raises capital by the issuance
of its own debt and that capital is then
utilized in the business operations of the
Williams
Company
and
its
several
subsidiaries,
including
Petitioner.
Therefore, it is very difficult to determine
what portion of the stock and debt of the
Williams Company should be allocated to
Petitioner. Further, there is no specific
information available concerning the market
value of the non-public stock. Because of
the difficulties associated with accurately
allocating a portion of the equity value of
the parent company's non-publicly traded
stock to Petitioner, two tiers down, we find
that the stock and debt indicator is the
least reliable of the three traditional
indicators and will be given little, if any,
weight.
That case does not change the result here.
in Northwest Pipeline was a non-public

The parent company

corporation, whereas

here, Questar Corporation is publicly traded.

There is also

00009010
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some indication that Petitioner's portion of the total business
of its parent corporation is a larger portion than that which
was present in Northwest Pipeline.
that

case,

which

rendered

the

The difficulties present in
stock-and-debt

approach

inappropriate, are not present here.
DECISION AND ORDER
Based upon the foregoing, it is the decision and order
of the Utah State Tax Commission that the value o£ the subject
property for the tax year 1988 is $296,000,000.

The Property

Tax Division of the Utah State Tax Commission is hereby ordered
to adjust its records in accordance with this decision.
DATED this

^3

day of ^ j f c Q . ^

1990.

BY ORDER OF THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION.

R.'H. Hansen
Lairman

G. Blaine Davis
Commissioner

B. Pacheco
Commissioner

NOTICE: You have ten (10) days after the date of the final
order to file a request for reconsideration or thirty (30) days
after the date of final order to file in Supreme Court a
petition for judicial review. Utah Code Ann. §§63-46b-13(l),
63-46b-14(2)(a).
JGL/sd/9398w
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ADDENDUM B

1
21

FILED

31

FEB 1 1991

4

' y f t ^

5

61
7

8

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA

9

COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

1

101
AT&T COMMUNICATIONS OF
CALIFORNIA, AND AMERICAN
TELEPHONE
AND TELEGRAPH COMPANY
121
Interstate Division
13
Plaintiffs,
14
vs.
11

15
16

NO. 500802
DEPT. 24
and 500803
(Consolidated)
STATEMENT OF DECISION

STATE BOARD OF EQUALIZATION, et al•
Defendants.

17
18

This is an action for refund of property taxes paid by

19

plaintiffs AT&T Communications of California, Inc. ("AT&T

201

California") and American Telephone and Telegraph Company -

21

Interstate Division ("AT&T Interstate") for the year 1986.

221

Plaintiffs are both units of AT&T Communications. AT&T

23

Communications, in turn, is a division (although not a legal

24

entity) of American Telephone & Telegraph Company, comprising

25

the regulated long distance telecommunications service

2G

operation of AT&T.

27

California for tax purposes was centrally assessed by defendant

28

The value of plaintiffs1 property in

1

State Board of Equalization ("the Board"), pursuant to Revenue

2

& Taxation Code sections 721-833.

3

at $1,150,000,000.

J

$600,000,000.

g

their property at a value in excess of the fair market value

g

and that the taxes assessed by the Board and paid by plaintiffs

n

to the defendant counties were illegally and erroneously

AT&T California was assessed

AT&T Interstate was assessed at

Plaintiffs contend that the Board overassessed

gll assessed and collected,
g
IQ

Revenue & Taxation Code section 5170 governs this action.
It provides:
"In suits for the refund of state-assessed
property taxes, the trial court shall not
be restricted to the administrative record,
but shall consider all evidence relating to
the valuation of the property admissible
under the rules of evidence. The court
shall base its decision upon the preponderance of the evidence before it."

11
I2||
joll
|i

15
16
17
18
19

201
21

221
23
24

The Board moved for summary judgment, declaring the
statute unconstitutional.

The motion was denied by the

Sacramento County Superior Court, Judge Anthony
DeCristoforo, Jr., on August 25, 1989.

The Board's petition

for a writ of mandate seeking review of this decision was
denied by the Court of Appeal for the Third District on
September 27, 1989.

The issue is therefore determined for

purposes of this trial.

See Code of Civil Procedure

section 437(f); Conway v. Bughouse, Inc. (1980) 105 Cal.App.3d
202-203.

The Court has proceeded in accordance with Revenue &

25

Taxation Code section 5170.

26

all relevant evidence from the administrative record offered by

27

the parties, but also the additional "evidence relating to

2S

The Court has considered not only

2

valuation of the property "admissible under the rules of

211 evidence" offered by the parties.
o

The Court finds that plaintiffs adequately exhausted

J

their administrative remedies before the Board and adequately

g

stated their grounds for refund in the claims for refund filed

gji with the defendant counties. The claims for refund asserted
Jl that the tax has been "erroneously or illegally collected" and
g

"illegally assessed or levied" (PI. Ex. 132-133), the statutory

9

grounds for refund under Revenue & Taxation Code section 5096.

10

This appears to be a sufficient statement.

11

Inc. v. City and County of San Francisco (1976) 16 Cal.3d 14,

12

28.

13

petitions for reassessment and claims for refund were adequate

14

notice to the Board and the defendant counties that plaintiffs

15

asserted that their property was overvalued because of factual

16

and legal errors in the income and cost approach methodology

17

employed by the Board.

18

every detail of what later became a six-week inquiry into

19

valuation theory.

20
2J

correct value; that question was clearly presented by

24
25

28

Plaintiffs were not required to specify

For this trial de novo, the basic issue was

In view of the complex nature of this action, the Court
deems it appropriate to make some preliminary comments and
findings before proceeding to discuss in detail the factual and
legal basis for its decision.
By enacting Revenue & Taxation Code section 5170,

26
27

If more is needed, the Court finds that plaintiffs'

plaintiffs.

22
23

Bret Harte Inn,

effective January 1, 1989, the Legislature imposed on already
c^f

rburdened trip.] cmrtr the ccir-plox subject of valuation of

public utilities.

Before the enactment of Section 5170, the

function of the Court was to review the administrative record
to determine whether or not the market value of property, as
determined by the Board of Equalization, was supported by
substantial evidence.

After the enactment of Section 5170, the

function of the Court is to make an independent determination
of market value based on a preponderance of the evidence.

The

Court, by the terms of Section 5170, is not restricted by the
administrative record, but is to consider all evidence relating
to valuation which is admissible under the Rules of Evidence.
The burden of proof is upon the plaintiff property owner.

As

is to be expected, the trial of such actions takes
substantially longer than the administrative hearing, as each
side not only presents those portions of the administrative
record which are favorable to its position but presents
testimony from experts and others to fortify its position.
The inevitable result of a trial of such actions is that
the Court, by its decision, imposes on the Board the judgment
of the trial judge as to how market value is to be determined.
If the trial judge determines that the State Board of
Equalization's methods of valuation are incorrect, then it
sends a message to the Board to change those methods of
valuation to those the judge believes to be appropriate,
regardless of how difficult, time-consuming, or expensive it
may be to implement those methods.

In the usual situation, the

Court must choose which method of valuation is the one most
likely to lead to the correct value, unless it elects to pick
and cheer.c from the export testimony to arrive at a market

~^4-

j

value which the Court determines is fair and reasonable under

91| the evidence in the case.
3j[

If the Court elects to accept the method or methods of

A\\

the plaintiff's experts over the defendant's experts, or vice

g

versa, what results, as the Court has seen a number of times in

g

this case, is that the plaintiff or the defendant will later

^

point to a holding of a trial court, either in this state or

g

another state, to persuade the Court that the experts

g

testifying before the Court, particularly where they are the

JQ

same experts who testified in the previous cases, which is the

2*

usual situation, are either brilliant or incompetent, or both,

12

depending upon the holdings of the trial courts in those

23

previous cases. By virtue of hearing a case on valuation, a

-• j

trial judge ostensibly becomes an expert on valuation, whose

25

opinion is to be accepted over experts who have devoted their

2g

lives to the subject.

2«7

If this Court has learned anything in this trial, it is

2g

that determining the fair market value of a public utility is a

2Q

most difficult task.

90

minds - both judges and experts on valuation - may differ

91

markedly.

92

least five different methods of valuing a public utility, each

23

of which - or none of which - may be applicable in a particular

24

case.

25

value vastly different than another method of valuation.

2(j

V a l u a t i o n c a n n o t b e d o n e w i t h m a t h e m a t i c a l c e r t a i n t y ; it is a n

27

art, not a science.

28

°* judgrr-crt.

It is an issue over which reasonable

As the evidence in this case disclosed, there are at

Furthermore, one method of valuation may result in a

It boils down to an intelligent exercise

It 5 ^ £]w?yr an estirate built on a foundation of

~ £ _.

assumption.

It is an attempt to ascertain what a public

utility would sell for if it were for sale under ideal
conditions, between a willing and knowledgeable buyer and a
willing and knowledgeable seller.

Since there are relatively

few sales of public utilities, and those few that are made are
not typical, there are no comparable sales upon which to base
value.

Instead, conclusions as to market value are based on

each appraiser's best judgment, and each appraiser approaches
the task of valuation with his own assumptions and theories as
to what potential buyers and sellers would or should consider
in arriving at a price.
Experts, even those on the same side, seldom agree with
the methods of other experts. The most graphic example of that
in this case is that the outside experts retained by the Board
of Equalization to make an independent valuation of the
plaintiff's property, used methods other than those used by the
Board's in-house appraisers and were of the opinion that the
composite limited-life method of appraisal used by the in-house
appraisers was not a good method of valuation for plaintiff
public utilities, which did not have a limited life. The
in-house appraisers for the state, as well as the manuals used
by the state for valuation, were of the view that the
stock-and-debt method of valuation, which was the basic method
used by the state's outside appraisers, was not a good method
of valuing a public utility whose stock was not traded in the
open market.

Plaintiffs are subsidiaries of AT&T and do not

have publicly traded securities.

The Board's outside

acpraifrcrs purported to use ar: ir-come approach in addition to a

-c-

j II stock and debt approach.

The Court finds, howeverf that the

2

so-called direct-capitalization-income approach used by them is

g

not a true income approach but is in reality a stock-and-debt

^

approach in the guise of an income approach.

5

Ironically, both the Board's in-house appraisers and its

g

outside appraisers ended up with approximately the same result,

^

a valuation, which in the view of the Court, was grossly

g

excessive.

n

employed by both the Board's in-house and outside appraisers

IQ

were not methods likely to result in the correct market value

11

°f public utilities such as those involved in this case.

j9

The conclusion is inescapable that the methods

The fact that the value set by the Board and its experts

jo

was grossly excessive was convincingly established by the

|4

testimony of Dr. Hal B. Heaton, an associate professor of

jc

finance at Brigham Young University, who for the past two years

|g

has been teaching at Harvard Business School.

17

premise of Dr. Heaton's testimony was that in order to pay

ig

$16,000,000,000 for the system property of AT&T, the value set

19

ky the Board, one would have to finance the purchase price and,

on

in order to do so, one would have to convince investors that

91

there would be sufficient cash flows to pay them a fair rate of

22

return, given the risk of the investment, plus a return of

23

principal.

24

be done.

25

negative growth; a 60 percent pay-out; and a 30 percent

26

pay-out.

27

optimistic assumptions about future cash flows.

2S

dencr.str?t-c(? crnv: rr: ngly that ever with such unrealistically

The basic

He demonstrated that, realistically, this could not

He used four different scenarios:

a zero growth; a

In each of these scenarios, he made unrealistically

-7-

He

-til optimistic assumptions, the numbers just did not work.

In

2

other words, one could not justify a value of the system

g

property of AT&T of $16,000,000,000 or even close to it. The

M\\ testimony of Dr. Heaton made good sense and was consistent with
g

the fact that AT&T is a regulated utility which cannot earn

6

more than a fixed percentage of its rate base, except in rare

~\\ situations which were not present in this case. The only
jj conceivable way that it could be valued substantially in excess

9
10
11
12

of its rate base would be to assume that it would be
deregulated in the foreseeable future.

Such an assumption is

unsupportable under the evidence in this case.

In fact, the

evidence supports a contrary finding.

13

Having made the aforesaid preliminary comments and

14

findings, I shall now set forth more specifically the factual

15

and legal basis for my decision in this case.

16

have considered the proposed statement of decision submitted by

17

plaintiffs and the objections thereto submitted by the

18

defendants.

19

recitation of the facts reflects how I resolved that conflict.

20

In doing so, I

Where there was a conflict in the evidence, my

After consideration of the evidence presented, I find

21

upon a preponderance of the evidence that the fair market

22

values (as defined in Board Rule 2) of the taxable unitary

90

property of plaintiffs in California as of the lien date,

24

March 1, 19 86, are:

25

For AT&T California - $748,959,533

2G

For AT&T Interstate - $364,880,423.

27

As of the lien date, AT&T Interstate was regulated by the

2Si

Fedrrcl Ccmiruni rnticns CommiFsion ("FCC");

-8-

AT&T California war,

j

regulated both by the FCC and by the California Public

2

Utilities Commission ("CPUC").

g

required to provide adequate and proper communications services

^

at regulated rates to those who request service.

g

plaintiffs may charge were regulated by the rate base/rate of

g

return method.

j\\

charge rates that may generate revenues sufficient to cover

«

costs of service —

q

depreciation, taxes, and a reasonable rate of return on rate

AT&T Communications was

The rates

Under that method, plaintiffs were allowed to

the total of operating expenses,

JA

base.

Plaintiffs were only allowed the opportunity to earn,

U

not guaranteed, a reasonable return on rate base.

j9

under regulation, is basically original cost of plant in

jo

service, plus materials and supplies, plus working capital,

«4

less accumulated depreciation and less accumulated deferred

15

income taxes.

Rate base,

The FCC and CPUC determine the rate of return using the
16
j7J| same general principles. Each component of the capital
•to

structure —

debt, preferred stock, and common stock —

is

jo

evaluated.

on

preferred stock is fixed at the "embedded" or actual cost.

91

rate of return on (or market cost of) equity is estimated by

90

the regulators.

23

estimate that rate of return currently currently required to

24

attract equity capital to the utility, given its particular

25

risk characteristics.

2Q

to be a weighted average of the rate of return allowed on each

27

capital component.

The rate of return on (or cost of) debt and
The

The rate of return on equity is designed to

The final rate of return is determined

28

-9-

«

Rate base is significant as a value indicator for a

2

regulated public utility, such as plaintiffs.

Rate base is

o

relevant in estimating the fair market value of the property

J

because the fair market value should reflect the earning

g

capability of the property.

/J

base the maximum amount upon which the regulated company, or a

7

purchaser, will be permitted to earn a fair rate of return.

8

Fair market value may be higher or lower than rate base for a

9

given company at a given point in time; the Court does not mean

The regulatory process makes rate

10

to imply that rate base is ceiling on value.

11

however, that rate base is the focal point of value and the

12

value of a public utility that is totally regulated, as

13

plaintiffs are, will not exceed rate base in the absence of

14

unusual circumstances, which do not exist in this case.

15

The Court finds,

Rate base is a measure of what the regulators deem to be

16

the capital at work.

The regulators set cost of equity capital

17

at the current return available in the market place; regulatory

18

estimates are reasonable.

19

the utility to earn a reasonable return on capital and to

20

attract new capital at a fair price. The purchaser of

21

regulated utility property must live in the same regulatory

22

environment and would expect to earn only the same return on

23

rate base.

24

presumed to have other investment opportunities available to

25

him, it would not be logical to assume that a purchaser would

26

accept a lower return by buying utility property at a price

27

higher than rate base when higher returns would be available

2S

c? nowhere.

The goal of regulation is to allow

Since the purchaser of utility property must be

-10-

1

The Board's appraisal expert witnesses justified values

2

in excess of rate base upon the speculation that AT&T

g

Communications would be deregulated or its rates would be

4

increased.

g

and not supported by the evidence,

g

regulated utility as of the lien date and there was no

^

reasonable expectation that this situation would change in the

g

foreseeable future.

g

willing buyer and a reasonable willing seller would not

IQ

The Court finds that the assumptions were in error
AT&T was a rate base

The Court finds that in 1986, a reasonable

consider deregulation in their assessment of value.

jj

Moreover, regulation is a substitute for competition,

j2

There would have to be true competition for deregulation of.

jo

AT&T Communications ever to occur and excess profits would be

14

unobtainable in a true competitive environment.

jc

finds on the evidence in this case that deregulation in any

|g

environment it would be likely to occur would not increase

The Court

jnii value.
jo
jq

Determination of Value.

The Court finds the system value

of the taxable property of AT&T Communications to be rate

20J1

base

2j

Communications system is $10,137f112,000.

22

nontaxable working capital and construction work in process

23

("CWIP").

*

Rate base of the taxable property of the AT&T
This figure excludes

In order to produce a California value for each

24
25JI —
Substantial authority from out-of-state supports valuing
regulated utility property at rate base for property tax
2(j|| purposes, absent some persuasive evidence that establishes a
different value. See Montaup Electric v. Board of Assessors,
27jI 390 Mass. 847, 460 N.E.2d 583 (1984); Boston Edison Co. v.
Assessors of Watertown, 387 Mass. 298, 439 N.E.2d 763 (1983);
State* ex rel . Wisconsin River Power Co. v. Board of Review, 125
28 Wis.2d
94, 370 N.W.2d 580 (1985).

-II-

1

individual taxpayer from the system valuation at rate base of

21 AT&T Communications, it is necessary to allocate the system

31

4

value to the value of the property of the two taxpayers in

1

5

California, apply a taxable percentage, and add growth
2/ and the
telephone plant under construction in California,—

61

investment of participating carriers. The Court finds the

7

percentage allocations and additives set forth in PI. Ex. 60 to

8

1

9

be true and correct.

The California values the Court finds are

therefore derived from rate base as follows:
AT&T
Communication 5;
of California

10|
11

SYSTEM VALUATION,
AT&T Communications
121
Factor 13 Allocation
State of California
14 STATE OF CALIFORNIA
VALUE BEFORE EXEMPTION
15

AT&T
Interstate
Division

$10,137,112,000

$10,137,112,000

7.0943%

3.4205%

719,157,137

346,739,916

$

99.87324%

97.41550%

16

Taxable Percentage

17

STATE OF CALIFORNIA
VALUE AFTER EXEMPTION

$

718,245,533

337,778,423

18

Add: Growth
Telephone Plant Under
Construction in California

$

30,714,000

23,325,000

0

3,777,000

19
20

Investment of
Participating Carrier

211

Total Additions

22|
23

STATE OF CALIFORNIA VALUE

$

30,714,000

$

27,102,000

748,959,533

$

364,880,423

24
II

25
26
27
2S

—
The Court accepts the allocation percentages testified to
ir detail by Wayne Henderson between growth and replacement
CWIP. (TR. 445-465; PI.Ex.46-51). These percentages are
carried forward into the Schoenwald appraisal. (TR. 980-81;
PI. Ex. 60). To the extent that there is a conflict in the
evidence on the correct allocation percentages, the Court
rrfolvcs th^ conflict ir, fpvor of plaintiffs. Growth CWIP is
the correct addition to the system value to reach fair market
value.

1

These values are next allocated among the defendant

2

counties according to the method of computation set forth in

3

PI•Ex. 132-34.

4

for tax refunds against the respective defendant counties in

5

the amounts set forth in the allocation tabulations attached

g

hereto as Exhibits A and B.

7

interest at 9 percent per annum from the date of filing the

g

claims for refund to the date of judgment, to be included in

g

the judgment.

20

Plaintiffs are therefore entitled to judgments

Plaintiffs are further entitled to

See Revenue & Taxation Code section 5150. The

Court finds prejudgment interest to run from October 5, 1987.

j]

In reaching these values, the Court has employed the

22

income approach to value as the fundamental approach to be

23

followed.

24

and reasonable value approach, on the evidence in this case. A

25

purchaser of regulated utility property must be assumed to act

26

rationally.

27

property on which it could only earn less than a market rate of

28

return when other investment opportunities are available to the

29

investor in the investment marketplace.

20

purchaser would expect to realize the income that the seller

21

could potentially realize on the regulated property.

22

The Court considers this to be the most realistic

The purchaser would not invest its money in

A prospective

The rate of return permitted under regulation is the

23

regulatory determination of a fair market rate of return on

24

equity, although only the embedded or historic return on debt

25

is permitted.

26

return on debt was higher than the historic rate of return on

27

AT&T's actual debt, a hypothetical purchaser of the regulated

2S

property vrculc either have to absorb the difference cr seek a

Since, at the lien date, the market rate of

j

rate increase which the Court, as noted, finds a purchaser

2

would not be entitled to assume.

3

had not historically been able to earn its allowed rate of

4

return.

5

that required automatic refunds of earnings above the allowed

g

rate of return in individual service categories without any

7

recovery of deficiencies.

g

to cause a lowered long-term realizable rate of return below

g

the allowed rate.

Moreover, AT&T Communications

The Company was also subject in 1986 to regulation

The regulatory treatment was likely

In setting value at rate base, therefore,

20

the Court rejects plaintiffs1 position that value should be

22

less than rate base by reason of the likely inability to

22

achieve the allowed rate or return and the obsolescence imposed

23

ky regulation through the allowance of only the embedded or

24

historic cost of debt.

25

plaintiffs' potential for earning above the allowed rate of

2g

return by the margin permitted under regulation.

27

finds that a willing buyer and willing seller would most

23

probably project the future rate of return at the allowed rate

2g

of return under regulation.

20

Offsetting these factors, is

The Court

Finally, in determining value at rate base, the Court has

21

made the same addition to net utility operating income and

22

deduction from it that Dr. Schoenwald made in his appraisal.

23

In order to derive the net cash flow that the purchaser could

24

be

ex

Pected

to

realize from the regulated property, the Court

25

adds back to net income the amount of AT&T Communications1 book

26

depreciation to reach gross cash flow; from this is deducted an

27

amount for capital expenditures equal to depreciation,

OQ

returning to a figure- for ret msh

-14-

flow that in the same as the

I

original net utility operating income. This computation makes

9

the addition of depreciation required by Rule 8(c) and DeLuz

3

Homes, Inc. v. County of San Diego (1955) 45 Cal.3d 546, and

4

makes the deduction of capital expenditures required by the

g

definition of gross outgo in Rule 8(c). The Rule requires the

g

deduction of "capital expenditures (or annual allowances

^

therefore) required to develop and maintain the estimated

g

income."

g

capital outlays are deducted from cash flow equal to

in
11
12
13

For a rate base regulated utility, if necessary

depreciation, they restore rate base.

Consequently, AT&T

Communications1 rate base will be maintained, the related
earning power will be maintained and the telecommunications
operating system will be maintained.

Unless rate base is

maintained by investments equal to the annual decline in rate
jr|| base resulting from depreciation of assets, rate base will
-tgii decline.

Income will therefore also decline as the rate or

Yj I return is applied to a smaller rate base.
jo

The Court has thereby determined value based upon an

19

income approach, capitalizing the net cash flow that could be

20

realized on rate base at the allowed regulatory rate of return,

21 which the Court determines to be a reasonable estimate of the
2o|| market cost of capital, to reach a value at rate base.
90

The Court deems it significant that the 1986 values from

24

21 states assessing AT&T Communications on a unit basis ranged

25
2(j

from a low of $8,750,000,000 to a high of $12,995,000,000 with

27

include working capital (it is an exempt intangible in

28

California).

a median of $10,670,000,000. Virtually all these values

The Board's valup converted to a system va3ue was

- 1 r-

1

$17,500,000,000.

2

some $4,500,000,000 higher than the next highest state, and

3

$7,000,000,000 higher than the median of the other states doing

^

unit appraisals.

g

system working capital is added as computed by the Board) is

g

above the median value determination of other state taxing

^

authorities.

g
o

The California imputed system value is thus

The Court's system value determination (if

The Board's Appraisal.

The Court would ordinarily find

no necessity to analyze the methodology underlying the Board's

in

appraisal as the Court has made a factual determination

U

rejecting the Board's value results on the grounds already

12

stated.

jo

Board and the City and County of San Francisco requests that

IJ

analysis, however.

jc

Board's results are wrong.

|g

The Request for Statement of Decision filed by the

That analysis will demonstrate that the

The Board's value findings were not supported by the

*7

evidence.

The Board occupied much trial time stating the

lg

assumptions of its appraisal but offered no factual evidence to

19

support the assumptions.

9Q

assumptions of the Board's income and cost approaches to be

91

wrong.

22

personally observed or on hypotheses that find support in the

93

evidence.

24

G.W. Thomas Drayage Co. (1968) 69 Cal.2d 33, 44.

95

expert's opinion is based on factual assumptions that are not

26

supported by evidence, it is either inadmissible, or, if

27

///

25

///

Plaintiffs proved critical factual

"An expert must base his opinion either on facts

[Citations omitted.]11

16-

Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v.
If the

II

3/

j

admitted, is not substantial evidence to support a judgment.—

2

The 1986 Board appraisal, as an opinion of value, is not

g

substantial evidence to support a judgment.

4

The Board presented no fact witness to support its

g

assumptions and no expert witness to verify the conclusions of

J

its 1986 appraisal.

~

Mr. Hendrick, had not formed any opinion of market value.

g

could have prepared a new appraisal but did not do so and was

g

not asked to do so.

The Board's only staff expert witness,
He

The Court rejects as lacking basis in

-Q

substantial evidence his opinion that the 1986 appraisal was

jj

"consistent with market value."

29

(1) the 14-year life estimate upon which the composite life was

2o

based; (2) the capitalization rate study that produced the

24

11.25 percent basic capitalization rate; or (3) any of the

Mr. Hendrick could not verify:

factual information in the appraisal.

In addition, he had not

2gj| formed an opinion of value with which to compare the 1986
27

results and could not tell how the 1986 appraiser had reached
her conclusions.

2g||

The Board's appraisal was based upon an historical cost

on

approach and its composite limited-life-income approach.

91

was no stock and debt indicator computed.

There

22
23

3/

24
25
9P
11

—
Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Zuckerman (1987) 189
Cal.App.3d 1113, 1134-1136 (expert's opinion of property value
in eminent domain case had nc evidentiary value and was not
substantial evidence to support judgment where based on
speculation and "assumptions which are not supported by the
record"); Hyatt v. Sierra Boat Co. (1978) 79 Cal.App.3d 325
337-339; Richard v. Scott (1978) 79 Cal.App.3d 57, 63-64

27|'
28
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j

The Board's Composite Limited Life Model.

The Board's

2

composite limited-life model begins with net operating income,

g

and then adds back taxes and depreciation.

^

thereby derived is capitalized by dividing it by a

g

capitalization rate that includes a so-called basic rate for

g

return on investment plus a component for tcixes and a sinking

^

fund factor for capital recovery (derived by reference to the

g

basic rate and the assumed composite estimated remaining life

g

average of the diverse assets of the taxpayer).

The gross cash flow

A land

10

aversion is added to the result.

22

is not a substitute for capital replacements.

|9

no provision for necessary capital replacements.

"Capital

13

expenditures are outside the model."

The assumed

14

capital recovery is far less than the replacement expense

15

necessary for telecommunications operations to continue.

jg

The capital recovery factor
The model makes

(TR. 598.)

The central factual determination that must be made in

17

the limited-life model is the estimate of the composite

jo

remaining life of the assets.

jo

the capital recovery factor in the capitalization rate, and the

90

higher the value.

2j

composite life estimate would produce an error in the

22

appraisal.

23

Section, conceded there would be a "big problem" if the life

24

estimate is wrong —

25

estimate, the bigger the problem."

9P

agreed in response to the Court's questions that "the critical

27

factor is the estimate of the life" (TR. 1504); and that there

28

The longer the life, the smaller

Mr. Hendrick admitted that an error in the

William Jackson,

the manager

of

the Unit Valuation

"the bigger the error in your life
(TR. 1860).

would be ar; incorrect assessment of value if the

- 1 Q.

Mr. Jackson

life is wrong.,

1

(TR. 1536).

2

the wrong life . . .we get a problem" (TR. 1513) . "We do

o

recognize that the income approach is very much subject to

J

error unlike the cost approach. . . .

g

your life estimate . . . the error compounds. Because the

g

present wording tends to compound errors. . . ." (TR. 1529-30).

^

On direct examination, he volunteered:

"If we get

If you make an error in

There was no evidence to support the 14-year composite

jj estimated remaining life that the Board used in 1986. The life
q
10

11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
«jJ
25
26
27
28

computation was carried forward from a 1980 study, based upon
the 1979 assets of the AT&T Long Lines division, a different
taxpayer.

There was no study done and no estimate of the

composite remaining life of the 1986 assets that were the
subject of the appraisal. There had been sweeping
technological change between 1979 and the lien date in 1986.
The introduction of digital switching systems and fiber optics
transformed telecommunications technology in that period.
Competition in long distance service increased.

The new

technology and increased competition shortened lives of plant.
AT&T Communications was required to implement the new
technology to meet competition or else lose additional market
share.

Its 1986 telecommunications plant was in substantial

part obsolete.

AT&T Communications in 1986 was engaged in a

major capital asset replacement program to meet competition and
provide services.
The Eoard took no account of these undisputed facts in
1986, although it did to some extent in the next few years.
The composite life estimate the Board used for plaintiffs in
1987 was eight years, decreasing tc si:: years in 1989, and five

-19-

j

years in 1990. Mr. Hendrick admitted that plaintiffs' position

2

to the Board in 1986 requesting a seven year life was

3

"reasonable" (TR. 1445-46) . Plaintiffs offered calculations of

4

composite remaining life that were (after rounding down one

5

year and rounding fractions per Board practice) eight years for

g

each plaintiff based on lives determined by the FCC and seven

7

years for AT&T Interstate and six years for AT&T California

g

based on company engineering and marketing studies.

g

finds that the Board's 1986 14-year composite life estimate is

jA

The Court

wrong.

Ij

The limited-life model is based on four factual

jo

assumptions that find no support in the evidence.

jo

first three assumptions is necessary to the validity of the

24

model; the fourth is necessary to the validity of the Board's

25

modified capitalized income approach calculation.

2g

Each of the

First, the limited-life model assumes that it

2«7

capitalizes for a limited period of time a hypothetical "level

2g

annuity equivalent" of an undefined actual declining income

2g

stream.

on

true.

21

either on a theoretical basis or for any taxpayer.

22

Mr- Hendrick could not define the line of declining income

23

stream.

24

The Board has never determined if this assumption is
The Board has never defined the declining income stream,

Second, the liiiited-lif ^ no<;o.: ^r,f:un-e c that the

25

declining income stream from the lien date assets can be

26

maintained without capital replacements for the composite

27

limited life (at least).

The Board has never determined if

2S

this ascumptiur: is true.

Mr. Hendrick admitted that if capital

j II replacements do have to be made to maintain the assumed
2

declining income stream, then the Board would have to use a

on different model.
jI

The Board's composite life model will always inflate

g

value, even given its assumption that replacements can be

g

ignored.

~

assumes forces more income into the early years of the

The level annuity income stream that the model

jj composite life, thereby erroneously increasing present value
q

above the present value of the actual declining income stream

10

from the rate base regulated assets, scheduled out year by year

11

and discounted.

12

its hypothetical level annuity income stream is equal to the

13

proper actual declining income stream for plaintiffs is wrong.

14

The Court finds the Board's assumption that

Wayne Henderson, AT&T's witness directly involved in

15

capital budgeting, outlined the capital expenditures that AT&T

16

was required to make in 1985 to remain in business. He

17

testified that AT&T could not continue without capital

18

replacements for even two years and that a "death spiral" would

19

soon result unless continuous replacements were made.

20

Mr. O'Rourke testified that computations projecting

21

depreciation from assets in place without replacements don't

22

"have anything to do with reality."

23

replaced for a utility.

24

that the assumed declining income stream for plaintiffs can be

25

maintained without replacements is wrong.

2G

Plant is continually being

(TR. 1653-54.)

The Board's assumption

By this assumption, the Board assumes away Rule 8(c).

27

If, as is the fact here, replacement expenditures are

28

crntinucuslv neccsparv to maintain even a declining income

1

stream, then, under Rule 8(c), those expenditures must be

2

deducted to reach the net cash flow that is properly to be

o

capitalized.

4

The amount of income to be capitalized must be

g

discretionary income available to the utility owner.

No true

g

value can be derived by capitalizing supposed "cash flow" that

7

is required to operate the utility.

o

properly capitalize as income supposed "cash flow" that the

g

utility must devote to maintenance of plant, or to salaries of

The Board could not

IQ

employees, or to any other necessary expense of operation.

JJ

same is true of supposed "cash flow" that must be devoted to

j9

replacements necessary to maintain operations,

jo

The

Third, the composite limited-life model assumes that

Ij

millions of AT&T Communications1 diverse assets can be averaged

jr

into a single asset so that the annuity concept can be used,

jg

Long-lived buildings are averaged with short-lived electronic

17

components.

|g

Communications telecommunications network involves interrelated

jo

teams of assets, all of which are necessary for the system to

90

function.

2]

the income stream will continue regardless of the fact that

29

necessary elements of the system will be retired before the end

23

of the assumed composite average life.

Composite life is a

24

meaningless mathematical manipulation.

It is not supported by

25

any academic quality appraisal literature or any literature

2(j

other than that authored by the Board.

27

relation to reality and sheds no light on value.

2g

life method violates proper appraisal methodology and Pule 8,

There is no recognition of the fact that the AT&T

The model assumes, contrary to the evidence, that

The result has no

The composite

1

Fourth, the Board's modified-capitalized-income approach

2

assumes that the regulated utility taxpayer keeps the entire

3

benefit of accelerated depreciation.

4

income approach is the second of two limited-life computations

5

that the Board does.

g

J factor by which the income valuations are increased to take

7

account of the benefit that the Board assumes the utility

g

taxpayer will derive from electing accelerated depreciation,

g

The mechanics of the modified calculation is to decrease the

The modified capitalized

The modified calculation uses a so-called

|Q

federal income tax component of the Board's capitalization rate

jj

and in consequence to increase the calculated value.

j2

Regulated utility taxpayers are required to elect a

13

system of accounting under which a deferred income tax reserve

24

is created.

25

effect of the deduction is to pass all the cash flow benefit of

2g

the election of accelerated depreciation through to the

17

consumer in the form of lower rates.

2g

the Board's modified-capitalized-earnings approach is based is

29

wrong as respects AT&T Communications/ a regulated utility.

20

would be wrong for any regulated utility under a similar system

2|

of accounting, and it would be wrong for any purchaser of the

22

assets of AT&T Communications on the evidence here, as

23

regulation of those assets would continue on the same basis.

24

The Board's assumption that AT&T Communications retains the

25

entire benefit of accelerated depreciation is wrong.

2(j

This reserve is deducted from rate base.

The

The assumption upon which

The Board has requested specific findings on the

27

components of its composite limited-life model.

23

income capitalized by the Board is

incorrect.

The level of

The Board's

It

1

add-back of depreciation with no deduction for capital

2

expenditures erroneously inflates the income capitalized and

3

also inflates the resulting value.

4

The Board's basic capitalization rate is incorrect.

g

basic rate is the average of the cost of debt and cost of

g

equity, weighted in accordance with an assumed capital

7

structure.

g

essential element of the basic capitalization rate, at 11.25

g

percent was not explained by any witness.

The

The Board's cost of equity determination, an

The determination is

jQ

far below prior and contemporaneous determinations of cost of

H

equity made by the CPUC and FCC.

12

determinations represent the regulatory assessment of current

jo

capital costs.

14

capitalization rate assumes that the hypothetical investor

|c

would accept less than the regulatory rate of return.

jg

evidence does not support that assumption.

17

percent determination is also far below the cost of equity

jo

determinations of 15.0 percent and 15.2 percent reached by

19

plaintiffs' witnesses.

90

percent cost of equity figure of its outside appraisers.

91

Court finds the Board's cost of equity is in error.

22

Board's cost of equity is in error, the basic capitalization

23

rate derived from the cost of equity is also in error.

91

These costs of equity

Mr. Hendrick admitted that the Board-determined

The

The Board's 11.25

It is even further below the 17.0
The

As the

The Board's cost of debt at 9.375 percent is an accurate

25

estimate of lien date cost of debt for Aa rated utility bonds,

og

The Board's problem here is that the Board has assigned too

27

great a percentage in the plaintiffs' assumed capital structure

90

for debt.

Unless the debt portion of the capital structure is

-?4-

1

reduced, the bonds may not be Aa rated and the debt cost would

2

increase.

3

capital structure, the Board's cost of debt is an accurate

4

estimate.

5

The Court cannot find that, with the Board's assumed

The Board's capital recapture component in its

g

capitalization rate is derived, as explained, from the Board's

7

estimate of the composite remaining life of the assets and the

g

basic capitalization rate.

g

the 14-year composite remaining life is wrong and that the

The Court has already found that

10

basic capitalization rate is wrong.

ii

component therefore is also wrong.

19

The capital recapture

Another issue presented by the capital recapture

jg

component computation is whether the Board should employ a

24

sinking fund component, as it did for plaintiffs, or a straight

15

line component.

jg

a straight line capital recovery component.

17

form for the straight-line method:

jg

(PI.Ex. 139.)

in

sinking-fund factor in the capitalization rate radically

20

increases the capitalization rate and reduces the resulting

21

capitalized earnings value indicator.

22

14-year life, the sinking-fund factor is .0326 and the

23

straiaht-line factor is .0714.

24

increases both the capital recovery component and the tax

25

component of the capitalization rate.

26

this example adds approximately eight percentage points to the

27

capitalization rate.

23

life (the life used in 1987) and the straight line factor for

For four railroad taxpayers, the Board employs
The Board has a

"Form V-557 Rev.8."

The substitution of a straight-line factor for a

For example, with a

Use of a straight-line factor

The combined effect in

For plaintiffs, substituting an eith-year

j

the sinking-fund factor reduces capitalized earnings values by

2

a total of 37-39 percent.

3

The straight-line method (which carries with it the

^

assumption that the income declines annually) better fits the

g

pattern of declining income from the decreasing rate base a

g

utility such as AT&T Communications would experience if its

^

assets were considered to be frozen in place as of the lien

g

date,

g

wrong, whether a sinking fund or a straight line factor is used

(TR. 1486; 3029.)

The composite limited-life model is

jQ

in the capitalization rate.

The use of the straight line

jj

factor mitigates the error, however, and at a minimum should

22

have been used by the Board for these taxpayers.

|o

witnesses did not explain how the taxpayers were selected for

14

whom the straight-line factor is employed.

15

appeared to be arbitrary ("division policy").

jg

Mr. Hendrick suggested that the capital recovery factor should

47

match the capital recovery practices of a prospective

18

purchaser.

10

plaintiffs, employ straight-line depreciation, and straight-

9Q

line depreciation is used uniformly under regulation, according

2i

to Mr. Hendrick.

Board

The determination
(TR. 1481.)

But all state-assessed utilities, including

90

The Board's capital recovery component of its model

23

purports to provide for a return of investment by adding a

24

factor to the capitalization rate that is the mathematical

25

equivalent of a sinking fund factor even though the Board

2G

explained that it does not assume a sinking fund method of

07

capital recovery.

90

recovery of investment bas^d en a sinking fund assumption has

The value result is the same, however.

-^b-

The

j

been rejected by the courts.

2

Department of Revenue 291 Or. 729, 635 P.2d 347 (1981); Pacific

3

Power & Light v. Department of Revenue 286 Or. 529, 596 P.2d

4

912 (1979); Burlington Northern Railroad v. Department of

5

Revenue U.S.D.C., Western Dist. of Washington, No. C85-767T

g

(October 25, 1985, Order Granting Preliminary Injunction); Soo

7

Line R. Co. v. Wisconsin Department of Revenue 89 Wis.2d 331,

3

278 N.W.2d 487, aff'd, 97 Wis.2d 56, 292 N.W.2d 869 (1980).

9

See Burlington Northern, Inc. v.

The Board's Cost Approach.

The Board's use of HCLD

IQ

(without deduction of the accumulated deferred income taxes) as

|i

a cost approach value indicator is based on the assumption that

jo

the regulatory authority would permit a prospective purchaser

13

t o wr

ite U P rate base to reflect the elimination of deferred

jj

income tax reserve upon sale.

If this assumption were not

j5

true, Mr. Hendrick admitted, HCLD should not be used as a value

jg

indicator.

17

assumption.

jg

would not permit property to be sold back and forth between

jg

utilities to inflate rate base. He agreed that rate base would

on

not

The Board offered no evidence to support the
Mr. Long testified unequivocally that the CPUC

increase because of a transfer for cash in which the seller

2J

had to pay off the deferred taxes. Both Mr. O'Rouke and

22

Mr. Long stated that the purchaser of utility property would

23

take the rate base of seller. Mr. Hendrick also conceded that

24

the further away HCLD is from rate base, the less reliable HCLD

25

is as a market value indicator.

2(j

Board's assumption is wrong,

27
2S

The Court finds that the

The Court has set forth in detail instances where Board
C.F sumptions? are wrong.

Inherent in some of these assumptions

-07-

are errors of law.

The Board has also committed other errors

of law as hereinafter set forth.
311

The Board's Limited Life Model. Board Rule 8(c)

A\

requires that "capital expenditures (or annual allowances

g

therefore) required to develop and maintain the estimated

g

income" must be deducted in computing the "net return" to be

y\\

capitalized.

o

adding back depreciation and making no allowance for capital

g

expenditures violates the rule. The Board must subtract future

10

The Board's method of capitalizing income by

replacement costs necessary to maintain the income from the

11

lien date assets.

12

Rule 8(b), the Board must comply with the definition of net

13

return to be capitalized set out in Rule 8(c). The Board's

14

model assumes an income stream that declines in reality,

15

contrary to Rule 8(c) that specifies an income stream that is

16

"maintained."

17

Even in computing a limited-life model under

The Board's add-back of depreciation to income to be

18

capitalized without recognition of necessary reinvestment for

19

cable, switches, and other plant, creates the illusion of a

20

systematic, annual recapture of investment, liquidating the

21
22

utility.

23

proper, adequate communications services. There would

24

necessarily be regulatory intervention if AT&T Communications

25
26

actually began to liquidate, along the lines of the Board's

27

This implicit assumption behind the composite

28

limited-life model, as determined by the Board, is that the

This cannot happen under the existing system of

regulation.

AT&T Communications has an obligation to provide

composite limited-life model.

-28-

enterprise will not necessarily operate beyond the composite
remaining life of the pool of assets. Instead, the Board's
assumption is that it is only necessary to return to investors
their investment in the pool of assets over the limited period
of time that the assets are assumed to provide income. The
assets are assumed to function and produce income without
recognition of required capital replacements. No provision is
made for replacements that are necessary to maintain the rate
base and related income stream.

None of these assumptions are

justified on the evidence before the Court.

The AT&T

Communications system is an interdependent network.
cease

It would

to function long before the Board's assumed composite

life was reached as essential categories of plant dropped out
of service.

The composite limited-life model is contrary to

reality.
The Board's add-back of depreciation and failure to
deduct capital expenditures dramatically increases the value
result by that step alone. When net operating income after
taxes is capitalized at the Board's basic rate, on comparable
assumptions, values below the Court's values result. Even the
addition back of taxes to net operating income and the addition
in the capitalization rate of a tax factor does not increase
value that much.

When the Board adds back depreciation and

capitalizes gross cash flow with no provision for replacements,
the capitalized income value explodes, entirely from the
Board's manipulating the numbers. This one step takes
capitalized income value from $523,737,090 to $1,195,662,724
for AT&T California and from $7,449,378,564 to $12,355,647,596
for AT&T Interstate.

2

Mr. Hendrick, the Board's expert, recognized that the

2

Board's composite limited-life model will always produce a

3

higher value result than a perpetual life model.

4

even though the limited-life model values the lien date assets

5

while the perpetual life model values the lien date assets and

g

all their successors.

^

should be worth less not more than these assets and their

g

successors.

o

value estimates.

This occurs

The lien date assets alone, plainly,

The model invariably produces inflated income
When a valuation method invariably results in

JQ

a higher valuation, the error is not a mere matter of appraisal

jj

opinion; the method is wrong as a matter of law.

22

Southern Railway (1985) 313 N.C. 177, 328 S.E.2d 235, 239.

23

See Matter of

The Board's method capitalizes gross cash flow, contrary

jj

to the settled principle from the academic and professional

2jJ

financial literature, and Rule 8 ( c ) , that provides only net

jg

cash flow, cash flow after deduction of necessary capital

27

expenditures, is to be capitalized.

lg

Board does not capitalize net cash flow.

jq

Mr. Jackson conceded the

The Court is not ruling that Board Rule 8 requires the

on

use of a perpetual life model.

The Rule permits the use of a

91

limited-life model if appropriate to the assets under

99

appraisal.

2Q

Board's model.

24

if capital expenditures were required to maintain the assumed

25

limited-life income stream —

There are limited-life models other than the
Mr. Hendrick, the Board's expert, conceded that

a fact the Court finds to be

26 true — the Board could not use its limited-life model,
27II although some other limited-life model might be used. He also
2<3

stated that it was possible to account for replacement

-30-

j

expenditures in other limited-life models. The Board's

2

composite limited-life model, as applied to these taxpayers on

g

the evidence before the Court, is invalid as a matter of law.

4

The Board's composite limited-life model on this evidence does

g

not comply with Rule 8(c).

g

Interest on debt is erroneously assumed under the

7

Board's composite limited-life model to remain constant. In

g

fact, the interest deduction necessarily decreases as debt is

g

paid down under the capital recovery assumptions of the model.

10

The Board has concluded that no reinvestment of the annual

Ij II capital recovery it proposes is required.

In consequence, the

22

utility owner must repay the debt portion of the capital

13

recovery.

14

tax payments increase, and the remaining amount of cash flow is

j5

insufficient to provide the required return on capital and

jg

return of capital.

17

purposes is therefore not constant and will continue to decline

jg

in accelerating fashion.

jg

assumed return and to recovery all of the invested capital

20

under the Board's assumptions.

21

Once that occurs, the interest deduction declines,

The cash flow after tax needed for these

It is impossible both to pay the

The tax factor therefore should reflect increasing

22

taxes.

23

expense.

24

inflated values. This is a structural flaw in the Board's

25

model that invalidates it as a matter of law for any taxpayer

26

t o w OIT1

27
2g

^

Instead, the Board's tax factor understates tax
The Board's tax factor thereby creates artificial

it ^ s applied.
Working capital is intangible property that is not

taxable.

See Board Rule 8(e); Roehm v. County of Orange (1948)

32 Cal.2d 280. Rule 8(e) provides xn part:
-71-

1

"When income from operating a property is
used [in capitalization], sufficient income

2

shall be excluded to provide a return on
working capital and other nontaxable
operating assets and to compensate unpaid
or underpaid management."

3II

4
The Board's deduction for
1
51 understated. Since the Board is
6
7

8

working capital*is
dealing with a before-tax

income stream, a sufficient amount of income must be excluded
on a before-tax basis to comply with Rule 8(e). The exclusion

1

should be determined by multiplying the amount of working

9

capital by a factor which includes the Board's basic

101 capitalization rate and tax factor. An insufficient amount is
11 provided by the Board, which uses the basic capitalization rate
121 only. The Board's model thereby violates the standards
13 prescribed by law, specifically the Board's own Rule 8(e).
14
Mr. Hendrick stated that the Board justifies the
15
16

inadequate exclusion by assuming that all utility income is
attributable to the tangible assets only, not the intangible

17

assets, although he could not say if this assumption is

18

correct.

19

This assumption is wrong.

Working capital is part of

rate base; the utility is entitled to earn the same return on a

201 dollar of working capital as on any other component of rate
21 base.
221
23
24
25
26
27
28

The Board's capitalization income value is logically
impossible.

The Board's assumed cash flow cannot be maintained

on any given set of facts.

If capital expenditures are made,

the cash flow stream will be far lower than that the Board
capitalizes.

If capital expenditures are not made, the cash-

flow stream will decline under rate base/rate of return
regulation.
-32-

j

The Board's composite limited-life model assumptions are

2

factually erroneous.

The model violates the standards

g

prescribed by law, specifically the Board's own Rule 8(c). It

^

is not validated by academic appraisal literature or by the

g

testimony of any outside expert witness in this trial.

g

contradicts the behavior and expectations of prospective buyers

j\\

and sellers of utility property and has no relation to the

g

reality of operation of a regulated utility enterprise.

g

Court noted in Soo Line R. Co. v. Wisconsin Dep't. of Revenue

It

As the

10

(1980) 89 Wis.2d 331, 341, 278 N.W.3d 487, 492, aff'd, 97

11

Wis.2d 56, 292 N.W.2d 869:

IQII

formula is whether it bears a reasonable relation to reality .

•jo

. . .M

IJ

reasonable relation to reality.

jr

"The ultimate test of a [valuation]

The Board's composite limited-life model bears no

Cost Approach.

The Board's cost approach violates the

jg

standards prescribed by law, specifically the Board's own

j7

Rule 3(d). The Rule states that if HCLD is used as rate base

18

k y t^ie

jo

as a value indicator.

20

indicator but concedes that the regulatory agency does not use

21

HCLD as rate base.

22

which is deducted to reach rate base must also be deducted to

re<

? u l a t o r y agency, it may be used by the taxing agency
The Board seeks to use HCLD as a value

The accumulated deferred income tax reserve

23 J J compute any valid cost indicator.
24

Southern Pacific Transportation Co. v. State Board of

25

Equalization (1987) 191 Cal.App.3d 938, 957 recently held that

2Q

if the regulatory agency did not use HCLD as a rate base, "the

27

condition precedent" to the use of HCLD as a value indicator

23

has not been net and it is a violation of Rule 3(d) to use that

-33-

j

method of valuation.

2

holding.

3

The Board's cost indicator violates this

In conclusion, the Court reiterates that the defendants

J

grossly overvalued plaintiffs' property.

The methods of

5

valuation it used were not those which were likely to arrive at

g

the fair market value of plaintiffs' property and were not

7

those that would be used by knowledgeable and realistic buyers

g

and sellers. One of the primary factors either a knowledgeable

g

and realistic buyer or seller would have to consider is whether

JQ

the purchase could be financed.

11

they would necessarily take into account that the public

22

Utilities to be sold are regulated utilities with a fixed rate

jg

of return on rate base, and that it is highly unlikely that

14

said companies would be deregulated in the foreseeable future,

j5

if ever.

|g

under such circumstances is the income method, where a

17

reasonable estimate of future earnings is made and those

jg

earnings are capitalized by a reasonable and realistic cost of

19

capital. The values set by the Court are reasonable and

20

realistic and are supported by the evidence, whereas the values

21

assigned by the Board to plaintiffs for 1986 are not, as they

22

3o not comport with the realities of regulation or the

23

investment marketplace.

24

In making this determination,

The most reasonable and realistic method of valuation

DATED: j l\\^t% J <i ' / '/'//

/
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ADDENDUM C

BEFORE THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION

NORTHWEST PIPELINE CORPORATION,
Petitioner,

:
)

v.

)

PROPERTY TAX DIVISION OF THE
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION,

:
)

Respondent.

FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
AND FINAL DECISION

Appeal No.
and

85-0074
86-0255

)

STATEMENT OF CASE
This matter came before the Utah State Tax Commission
(Tax Commission) for Informal Hearing for the 1985 and 1986 tax
years, on May 12, 1987.

Commissioners Hansen, Tew, Pacheco and

Davis heard the matter.

Mark K. Buchi represented the

Petitioner and Maxwell A. Miller represented the Respondent.
Also present on behalf of the Petitioner were David Schenk, Dr.
John Davis, and Dr. Hal Heaton.

Present for the Respondent

were Eckhardt Prawitt, Michael Goodwin, and Dr. James
Ifflander.

Bill Thomas Peters appeared representing the

various counties affected by the outcome of this decision.

Appeal Nos. 85-0074 and 86-0255
Petitioner is a wholly owned subsidiary of Northwest
Energy Company which in turn is a wholly owned subsidiary of
the Williams Company.

The Petitioner owns and operates a

natural gas pipeline system serving customers in seven western
states including Utah.

The unit valuation approach is being

applied to Petitioner's property.

The allocation factors used

to allocate a portion of the total pipeline system to Utah are
not in dispute.
The Respondent had concluded that the total unit value
of the Petitioner's pipeline systems for the years 1985 and
1986 were $900,000,000 and $1,100,000,000 respectively.

For

1985, 18.23% of the total system was allocated to Utah, and for
1986, 16.86% was allocated to Utah.

Petitioner's objections to

each assessment year were timely filed.

The parties have

agreed that the issues presented are identical for each of the
two tax years.
The issues raised are as follows:
1.

In the income indicator of value, are the values

attributable to growth expectations properly accounted for by
the parties in their respective appraisals; whether or not the
proper definition and projection of cash flow in the future has
been properly computed; and the applicability of direct vs.
yield capitalization methods?
2.

What is the appropriate calculation for the stock

.and debt indicator of value?
3.

Should intangible and other non-assessable

property values be deducted from the system value?
-2-
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4.

What is the proper adjustment, if any, for

obsolescence in the cost indicator of value?
5.

Should the fair market value of the Petitionees

property be reduced by 20% pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
S 59-5-4.5?
The parties presented their respective appraisals and
expert witnesses in support of their arguments and contentions
as it relates to the above referenced issues.
Based upon the evidence presented at the hearing, the
Tax Commission makes the following findings of facts and
conclusions of law.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Petitioner owns and operates a multi-state,

integrated gas pipeline system, a portion of which is located
in and subject to taxation by the State of Utah.

The

allocation or proportion figures used by the Respondent are not
disputed by the Petitioner.
2.

The tax years in question are the property tax

assessment years of 1985 and 1986.
3.

Petitioner is subject to regulation by the

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC).

The Petitioner is

regulated by FERC in functionally the same manner that state
utilities are regulated by the Utah Public Service Commission.
COST INDICATOR OF VALUE
4.

In the rate making process, FERC adjusts the net

book value of the Petitioner's property for deferred federal

-3-
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income taxes (DFIT) to arrive at an allowable rate base upon
which Petitioner is allowed to earn a rate of return.

An

informed investor would not be willing to pay full cost as
measured by net book value for Petitioner's operating system
because that amount exceeds the value of the rate base upon
which the investor would be allowed to earn.

Therefore, the

net book value should be reduced by the amount: of the DFIT in
accordance with the FERC practice .
5.

The position of the Petitioner is that the cost

indicator of value should be reduced for economic obsolescence
which has occurred because the Petitioner will actually earn
less than the FERC allowed rate of return.

However, the

established rate by FERC does not guarantee that Petitioner
will actually earn at that level.

The evidence indicates that

in recent years Petitioner has consistently earned less than
its allowable rate of return.

No evidence was introduced

regarding what factors caused the reduction in Petitioner's
income.

Therefore, we find the reduction in the earnings of

Petitioner is not due to factors external to the property
itself and as a consequence does not result in any economic
obsolescence to be deducted from the cost indicator of value.
INCOME INDICATOR OF VALUE
6.

Yield capitalization and direct capitalization

are both acceptable methods for the income indicator of value
insofar as the principles involved are consistently applied and
supported by competent evidence.
-4-
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7,

In direct capitalization of income, the value is

calculated by dividing the next years projected income by a
rate that is derived from an earnings/price ratio.
is V

=

I/R.

The formula

In yield capitalization, the value is calculated

by dividing a series of cash flows by_a rate that includes
growth.

The formula is V

=

CF/K.

These two formulas are not the same because the
elements are different.

The K in yield capitalization is

typically calculated with the formula K
dividends, P

=

price and G

=

=

D/P + G where D =

the growth factor.

A

substantial difference in the two methods is that in direct
capitalization no growth is included in the rate, but in yield
capitalization, growth is included.

If the principles are

correctly applied, each of the methods should arrive at
approximately similar conclusions.

The Petitioner has misused

the yield capitalization method by dividing an income stream
which does not include growth by a rate which does include
growth.

As a result the Petitioner's income indicator of value

is understated.
8.

In direct capitalization, the approach used by

the Respondent, the comparables used to develop an
earnings/price ratio are sufficiently comparable to warrant use
of that ratio.

In addition, Petitioner did not provide

convincing evidence that the use of the direct capitalization
method was inappropriate or inaccurate.
9.

The Petitioner also misapplied the income

approach to value by: (a) attributing a portion of the value to
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"intangibles", whereas, in the unit concept of value the entire
earning entity is deemed to be tangible property subject to
taxation, (b) using a declining income stream when the evidence
indicates the income would likely continue to increase, (c)
using data from non-comparable companies, and (d) including a
growth factor in the numerator of the formula used in
calculating the yield capitalization rate.
STOCK AND DEBT APPROACH
10.

The stock and debt indicator of value is

difficult to apply to the Petitioner.

Petitioner is a wholly

owned subsidiary of the Williams Company, a privately owned,
non-public corporation.

The parent corporation raises capital

by the issuance of its own debt and that capital is then
utilized in the business operations of The Williams Company and
its several subsidiaries, including Petitioner.

Therefore, it

is very difficult to determine what portion of the stock and
debt of The Williams Company should be allocated to
Petitioner.

Further, there is no specific information

available concerning the market value of the non-public stock.
Because of the difficulties associated with accurately
allocating a portion of the equity value of the parent
company's non-publicly traded stock to Petitioners, two tiers
down, we find that the stock and debt indicator is the least
reliable of the three traditional indicators and will be given
little, if any, weight.
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MISCELLANEOUS FINDINGS
11.

Tangible assets are worth more in the aggregate

as a going concern than as discrete and insular objects.
However, the Tax Commission does not find the argument of the
Petitioners persuasive that the added value is an intangible
which is not taxable.

The Commission would recognize a

deduction for an intangible where that intangible can be
removed, separated from the going concern, quantified, valued
and (theoretically) sold.

No convincing evidence was presented

of such an intangible amount.
12.

The Tax Commission does not accept the theory of

valuation as espoused by the Petitioner, i.e., that the income
stream will decline predictably.

This assumption is incorrect

in that it does not comport with the basic principals of
finance and valuation and it understates cash flows and
mismatches income to capitalization rates.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-4.5 provides for a 20%

reduction from the market values for residential, industrial
and commercial real property appraised by county assessors.
The 20% reduction does not extend to nor does it apply to
centrally assessed property such as that of the Petitioner.
Rio Algom Corporation v. San Juan County, 681 P.2d 184.
2.

The Tax Commission can neither declare 59-5-5.4

unconstitutional because it does not give a 20% reduction to
centrally assessed property nor extend the coverage of the
-7-
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section to centrally assessed property.

Shea v. State Tax

Commission, 120 P.2d 274, Utah 1941.
3.

The use of the unitary method of valuation meets

the requirement of Article XIII, Sections 2 & 3 of the Utah
Constitution.

The unitary method correctly assumes that the

value of the entire system as a going concern is greater than
the total fair market value of its equipment appraised as
discrete and insular parts, Western Airlines Inc. v.
Michunovich, 428 P.2d 3 (1967).

Any so called intangible

components of the tangible assets resulting from assemblage as
a going concern are due to synergy, and are therefore not
separately identifiable for valuation purposes.

No evidence

was presented at the hearing which would properly identify
intangible values which could be deducted from the going
concern value.

Based on the foregoing the Commission concludes

that:
4.

The cost indicator of value is $773,000,000 for

1985, and $805,000,000 for 1986, the income indicator of value
is $871,000,000 for 1985 and $1,114,000 for 1986, and the stock
and debt indicator of value is $850,000,000 for 1985 and
$983,000,000 for 1986.
DECISION AND ORDER
Based upon the foregoing findings of facts and
conclusions of law, it is the Decision and Order of the Utah
State Tax Commission that the value of the subject property for
ad valorem property tax purposes for the tax year 1985 is
$840,000,000 and for tax year 1986 is $1,055,000,000.
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It is therefore the order of the Utah State Tax
Commission that the assessment of the Respondent is affirmed
part.

The Respondent is ordered to adjust its cost indicator

of value to reflect a reduction for deferred federal income
taxes and the final conclusion of value as determined by the
Tax Commission.
DATED this J2J^

+
day of /\>c lejrnlpAJ

. 1987.

BYXJRDESkOF THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSI*
R.Hr. Ransen
drman
B. Pacheco
Commissioner

G. Blaine Davis
Commissioner

NOTICE: It is hereby given that you have 30 days from the
date of mailing of this decision to appeal to the Tax Court
or the Supreme Court of the State of Utah.
JEH/lgh/5239w
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, certify that on March 19, 1991, I served four copies of the Initial Brief
of Petitioner, Questar Pipeline Company, by first class mail upon counsel for respondent in this matter to the following address:
Paul Van Dam, Attorney General
Kelly W. Wright, Assistant Attorney General
Attorney General's Office
Suite 1100
36 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

